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ABSTRACT
Babies learn much of their first vocabulary through ostensive
definition. However, given a word that is defined through ostension,
there are an infinite number of possible meanings of the word. For
example, if a mother says "cup" while pointing to a cup, her pointing
does not provide a basis for excluding meanings like "a kitchen object"
or "an object with a flat bottom surface" or "an object 3/4 full of
liquid" or "liquid" or "red", etc. Thus, the mapping between words and
meanings should be impossible to achieve. Yet, children are experts at
word learning. They learn words quickly (Carey and Bartlett, 1978;
Heibeck and Markman, 1987; Oviatt, 1982) and often (Carey, 1982). Their
success is due to the knowledge they have about language, the world, and
their relationship in the form of constraints on the set of possible
meanings.
A constraint was proposed that would provide a partial solution to
the mapping problem. It states:
When children hear a new word used to refer to an object
(e.g., cup or dog), their first hypothesis about its meaning
is the kind of object. When they hear a word used to refer
to a non-solid substance (e.g., mud or sand) their first
hypothesis about its meaning is the kind of substance.
This constraint has two parts. First, it specifies that information
about ontological kind is relevant to word meaning. Second, it selects
"kind of object" and "kind of non-solid substance" as the meanings of
words, and it inhibits the mapping of other properties of objects and
non-solid substances with words.
In the first three experiments 2-year-olds were taught novel words
for unfamiliar objects and unfamiliar non-solid substances. They were
then asked to select another referent of the word out of two choices. In
the case of object words they chose an object of the same shape, size,
and number as the original referent even though it was different in
substance and color. In contrast, when they were given a non-solid
substance word, they chose another example of the original substance
ignoring the difference in shape, size, and number. The role of
count/mass syntax in fixing word meaning was also examined. There was no
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relationship between the subjects' ability to produce count/mass syntax
and their ability to use the object/substance distinction to constrain
word meanings. Also, subjects who were given the novel noun in selective
syntax were no better at determining the noun's meaning than subjects who
were given the noun in neutral syntax. The fourth study examined the
spontaneous speech of 4 children to test the hypothesis that solid
substance words are late acquisitions. The fifth experiment focused on
the applicability of the proposed constraint outside of the domain of
language. Children were given a heavy object and asked to predict which
of two other objects was heavy. They based their inferences on material
kind and not object kind. The sixth experiment asked how children define
object kind.
The main conclusion was that 2-year-olds do use the proposed
constraint, but do not use count/mass syntax, to constrain their
inferences about word meaning. However, there are certain situations in
which children have difficulty determining the meanings of object words
and non-solid substance words. It was argued that children use the
constraint in those situations but are struggling with the specification
of object kind and non-solid substance kind. Finally, although children
used the proposed constraint on inferences of word meaning, they were not
limited by it. When they were making nonlinguistic inferences, they had
other systems available for the representation and comparison of
objects.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Susan Carey
Title: Professor of Psychology
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Introduction
The acquisition of word meanings is often considered an easy task
because the final state is characterized as a mapping of words with
meanings. However, this view is simplistic and uninformed. It is not
clear that the final state is so simple; but, even if it is, the
acquisition of the mapping poses a tremendous computational problem.
This problem is due primarily to the nature of the evidence available to
children about word meanings.
Children commonly learn words through ostensive definition. Children
hear a word applied to a finite set of objects and need to determine the
common property of the set that is relevant to the word's meaning. For
every finite set of objects, there are an infinite number of common
properties. For example, a finite number of cups could all be red
things, cylindrically shaped things, small things, clay things, things
that touch lips, things that need support, objects at three o'clock, cup
things, smooth things, etc. Therefore, children must choose the correct
property out of an infinite set of properties. Regardless of the number
of examples that children are exposed to, the appropriate inference will
never be uniquely determined.
Furthermore, Quine (1969) has demonstrated that some of the meanings
in the infinite set of possible meanings could never be excluded through
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ostensive definition. For instance, every example of pointing to a
rabbit is also an example of pointing to an undetached rabbit part.
Therefore, "undetached rabbit part" can never be ruled out as a meaning
of "rabbit" given only ostensive definition. Given that the set of
possible meanings is infinite and contains incorrect meanings that cannot
be rejected, it should be impossible to acquire even a single word.
However, there is evidence that children are very good at learning
words. Young children can make an initial mapping of a word's meaning
after hearing it only two times (Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Heibeck &
Markman, 1987). 15-month-olds will comprehend a word and extend it
properly to new objects after hearing it used only 24 times to label one
object (Oviatt, 1982). And children learn nine words a day from their
second to fifth years (Carey, 1978). There is a discrepancy between the
difficulty of the task as suggested by the task description and the
difficulty of the task as suggested by children's success rates.
The only way to resolve this discrepancy is to posit constraints that
children bring to the task. That is, children must have prior knowledge
of language, the world, or the relationship between the two that works
with ostensive definition to limit the set of possible meanings from an
infinite number to only one or two. Children's knowledge constrains the
set of possibilities supplied through ostension.
One source of constraint could be the immaturity of infants'
conceptual systems. That is, while it is true that any given set of
objects has an infinite number of properties, maybe only a small subset
of properties are accessible or salient to infants as the basis of
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induction. However, habituation and sorting studies show infants to be
sensitive to any feature of the world that's been probed. For example,
they can categorize by color (Bornstein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976),
speech sounds (Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczyk, & Vigorito, 1971), two
dimensional shapes (Cohen, Gelber, & Lazar, 1971), objects (Ross, 1960),
prototypical structure (Strauss, 1979), number (Strauss & Curtis, 1981),
orientation (Wiener & Kagan, 1976), aspects of physical causality
(Leslie, 1986), correlations among features (Cohen & Younger, 1985),
etc. Therefore, in the case of word meanings, the immaturity of the
cognitive system is not sufficiently constraining. The properties that
infants can use for categorization need to be constrained such that only
some of them are considered as possible word meanings.
A number of psychologists have proposed and defended various
constraints. Each constraint restricts the set of possible word meanings
to a certain degree, but cannot stand alone. A set of constraints will
be necessary to fully enable the acquisition of word meanings.
Some of the constraints focus on the relationships between words.
Eve Clark (1985) has proposed a constraint called lexical contrast. With
respect to word learning the claim is:
When children hear a new word, they select a meaning for the
word that they do not already have encoded.
This constraint allows the extensions of two words to overlap.
Therefore, words like "pet" and "dog" are acceptable. They have
overlapping extensions, but not the same meaning. Ellen Markman and Gwyn
Wachtel (1987) have proposed a similar constraint called mutual
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exclusivity. It states:
When children hear a new word, they select a meaning for the
word that has an extension that does not overlap with the
extensions of all the other meanings they have encoded.
This constraint does not allow the pair of words "pet" and "dog" because
there are dogs that are also pets, and therefore it could not be correct
of the adult lexicon. However, it could be used effectively for a
certain period of time by children. These constraints are important
because they allow children to reject possible meanings of a new word on
the basis of previously encoded meanings. Clark's constraint specifies
that children can reject any meaning that is already encoded and
Markman's constraint specifies that they can reject a meaning in which
any member of its extension is also in the extension of a meaning that is
encoded. However, when children do not know many words, these
constraints are not very useful. And the constraints are only partially
useful for adults. Adults only know a finite number of words at any one
time. When they hear a new word, there are an infinite number of
possible word meanings, but they can only exclude the finite set of
meanings that they have encoded.
Frank Keil (1979) has proposed the M-constraint and the
W-constraint. These constraints are based on a predicability tree that
symbolizes which predicates span which terms. For a predicate to span a
term, it must be possible for the predicate to be true of the term
although it is not necessary for it to be true of the term. For example,
"is green" spans both grass and daisies because both grass and daisies
could be green. In fact, only grass is green. The constraint is:
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When children hear a new term, it must have a place on the
predicability tree such that given any two predicates that
span the term, P1 and P2, the sets of terms spanned by P1 and
P2 must be equivalent or in a subset/superset relation.
These constraints affect word meaning because they specify which terms
are allowable and which ones are not. Unfortunately, the predicability
tree takes time to form branches. It does not even begin until children
are approximately 5 years old. Therefore, it could not possibly
constrain word meanings for children between 2 and 5 years of age when
they are learning 9 words a day.
Other constraints have utilized the relationship between the
syntactic properties of a word and the meaning of a word. Landau and
Gleitman (1985) have proposed this constraint:
When children hear a new verb, they use the subcategorization
frames of the verb to specify the meaning of the verb.
This constraint is especially helpful in situations in which the children
have limited exposure to the referents of the words. However, the
constraint is only applicable to verbs. This specificity is not a
criticism of the constraint, but it does mean that other constraints are
necessary for other kinds of words.
Katz, Baker, and Macnamara (1974) claim that inferences about nouns
are also constrained by syntactic information. Their constraint is:
When children hear a new noun if the referent is animate or
symbolic of animate beings then: 1. if the noun is a common
noun, it refers to the class of things that the referent is a
member of; and 2. if the noun is a proper noun, it refers to
the original referent as an individual. When children hear a
new noun if the referent is not animate or symbolic of
animate beings, then it refers to the class of things that
the referent is a member of.
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For every noun one possibility is that it refers to only one referent as
the name of that referent. This constraint specifies the conditions
needed for that possibility to be correct. However, in the case of words
that refer to classes, this constraint does not specify which class --of
the infinite number of classes that include that object-- is the
appropriate referent of the word.
Brown (1957) has proposed a constraint that is applicable to verbs
and nouns. It is:
When children hear a new verb, they take its referent to be
an action. When they hear a new count noun, they take its
referent to be an object. When they hear a new mass noun,
they take its referent to be a substance.
The induction problem originally set up involved ostensive definition in
a situation such that the child knew what the referent was but did not
know what description of it corresponded to the word's meaning. However,
usually it is not as clear what the referent is. Words are spoken in
complex scenes which involve many objects, actions on those objects, and
things inside the objects. This constraint helps direct the child to the
referent. However, this constraint has a similar problem as the previous
one. The mechanism that the child then uses to pick out the correct
description of the action, object, or substance is not specified.
Waxman and R. Gelman (1986) have proposed a constraint that is based
on the distinction between nouns and adjectives.
When children hear a new noun, they think that it refers to a
category at a basic level or a superordinate level of
classification. When they hear a new adjective, they think
it refers to a category at a subordinate level of
classification.
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When the child does know which object is being referred to, one problem
is that the object can be described at different levels of abstraction.
This constraint exploits a non-obvious relationship between form class
and level. However, this constraint is also limited. It allows an
infinite number of hypotheses at the appropriate level.
Markman and her collaborators have proposed a pair of constraints
based on properties of the referents rather than properties of the
words. The first is called the taxonomy assumption (Markman &
Hutchinson, 1984). It is based on the distinction between thematic
categories and taxonomic categories. Thematic categories are groupings
of objects that are related by causality or events. For example, the
category containing a knife and a cut apple is thematic because there is
a causal relation between the members. Also the category containing a
dog and a dog-bone is thematic because dogs and dog-bones take place in
events together. Taxonomic categories are groupings of objects that are
related by similarity. Examples are "red things" and "heavy things".
Markman and Hutchinson propose the following constraint:
When children hear a new word used to refer to an object,
their first hypothesis about the meaning of the word is a
taxonomic classification of the referent.
Markman's second constraint (Markman & Wachtel, 1987) is:
When children hear a new word used to refer to an object,
their first hypothesis about the meaning of the word is the
whole object.
These constraints are very useful because they reject an infinite number
of thematic categories as possible word meanings. However, an infinite
number of taxonomic categories remain, even given the whole object
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constraint.
The constraints described so far are effective in constraining the
set of possible word meanings to a certain degree. However, they are not
powerful enough to complete the task, especially for very young
children. For example, consider a two-year-old's situation when the word
"cup" is ostensively defined. If the child does not yet know any words
that name any aspect of the situation, then the child could not use
lexical contrast or mutual exclusivity. The child is too young for the M
and W constraints. Landau and Gleitman's constraint is only applicable
to verbs. The remaining constraints (Brown, 1957; Katz, Baker and
Macnamara, 1974; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Markman & Wachtel, 1987;
Waxman and R. Gelman, 1986) would direct the child to select a meaning
with an extension that was a taxonomic class of objects at the basic
level or a superordinate level. However, an infinite number of meanings
satisfy this description. For example, the word could mean "artifact
that holds liquids" or "tool of a certain shape" or "tool of a certain
size" or "kitchen equipment" or "indoor equipment" or "ceramic things",
etc.
We have proposed the following constraint which addresses this
limitation and, like Markman's constraints, is based on properties of the
referents.
When children hear a new word used to refer to an object,
their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind of the
object. When they hear a new word used to refer to a
non-solid substance (e.g., mud or sand), their first
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hypothesis about its meaning is the kind of the substance.
Some constraints, including this one, have two parts: the antecedent
of the conditional (the basis) and the consequent (the inference). By
"basis" I mean the kind of information that the children use to decide
which meanings are correct. There is an infinite amount of information
available at any one time. There is syntactic information, information
about predication, information about color, etc. The basis of a
constraint specifies which kind of information is used. In this case the
basis makes explicit the role of the referent's ontological kind, as
either a solid object or a non-solid substance. That is, it states that
it is the ontological kind (at least for those two ontological kinds)
that determines the inference that a child will make.
"Ontological kind" can be defined in different ways. I define
"ontological kind" by referring to conditions for membership. The
conditions that specify membership in a concept vary for different
concepts. For example, for something to be a table, it needs to be move
coherently through space and have stable boundaries among other things.
Its color, material, and shape do not affect its tableness. However, for
something to be gold, it needs to have a certain molecular structure. In
other words, its material is essential and its coherence is not. Melted
gold, which would not move coherently, is still gold. Some concepts do
have the same conditions for membership: note that all objects (like
1. This constraint is meant to be a member of a set of constraints
including the others described. Therefore it is meant as an addition,
not a contradiction. It is intended for use in situations in which the
kind of object and the kind of substance are not yet encoded.
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tables) have coherent motion and stable boundaries as conditions for
membership and all substances have molecular structure as a condition for
membership. But the conditions for membership are not the same for all
concepts. If concepts are organized by kinds of conditions for
membership, the resulting groups will be ontological kinds. Therefore,
objects and substances are different ontological kinds.
I chose a subclass of the substances, the non-solid ones (e.g., mud)
because solid substances (e.g., wood) are ambiguous. They are always in
the form of objects. A particular piece of a solid substance, like an
object, has distinct boundaries and moves coherently. These properties
are irrelevant to the kind of substance, but do exist. This ambiguity
could create confusion when children are dealing with solid substances
and is examined in one of the experiments. Non-solid substances, on the
other hand, do not have distinct boundaries and do not move coherently.
They, therefore, are a less ambiguous contrasting class to objects.
The "inference" portion of a constraint consists of the actual
meanings that the children give the words. For example, in some of the
other proposed constraints the inferences are taxonomic kind, action, and
superordinate level category. In this case the inferences are "kind of
object" when the referent is an object and "kind of substance" when the
referent is a non-solid substance. Therefore, this constraint causes the
child to reject all the other properties of the object or substance
--including the taxonomic properties-- as possible meanings of the word.
An important question remains: what is meant by "kind of object" and
"kind of substance? This question can be answered by considering this
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phenomenon. If a number of adults were asked "What is this?" about an
object, they could all give different answers, regardless of the number
of adults asked. For example, two possible answers are "a red thing" or
"a metal thing". But, instead, they all give the same answer (Anglin,
1977). That answer is the kind of the object. Similarly if the adults
were asked what a particular non-solid substance is, they would all give
2
the same answer --the kind of substance. Another question is: how do
children (or adults) determine the kind of an unfamiliar object and the
kind of an unfamiliar substance? The proposed constraint does not
address this question. Rather it credits children with that knowledge
and addresses how they select those meanings out of all the possible
meanings of words. That is, this constraint provides a partial solution
to the mapping problem.
At first glance, "kind of object" may seem similar to the basic level
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). However, they are
not exactly the same. The work on the basic level provides an analysis
of the difference between descriptions of objects at different levels of
abstraction. However, it does not distinguish different descriptions of
objects at the same level, such as "red thing" versus "cup thing". I
have not provided an analysis of either difference. However, I have
2. Actually, the adults' answers depend on the situation in which the
question is asked. They answer at a different level of abstraction when
they are talking to children compared to when they are talking to
adults. That is, in response to the query, more than one answer may be
given; but, not more than a few and only one for each level. This should
not be a problem for the child, because adults agree on a single response
when talking to children and because the Waxman and R. Gelman (1986)
constraint helps the children fix the level of abstraction.
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defined "kind of object" more restrictively than basic level is defined.
The kind of an object is not just any description of an object at a
specific level of abstraction. It is a particular description of the
object. The fact that an analysis of that description is elusive does
not undermine its existence. The goal of the proposed constraint is not
to further clarify the notion of "kind of object", but rather to specify
how children select "kind of object" as the meaning of object words.
Three considerations support the proposed constraint. The first is
that infants have a concept of object. Elizabeth Spelke and her
collaborators (1985) have used the habituation paradigm to show that
infants at four months use the following criteria to individuate
objects. Any collection of surfaces that have stable boundaries, move
coherently, have substance, and are spatiotemporally continuous are
considered to be an individual object by the infant. One of the
techniques they used was to have infants habituate to a visual scene with
visual cues specifying the boundaries of a partially occluded object.
Then the infants were presented with the object as a single object or the
object as two objects. When the infants perceived the visual cues as
specifying a single object, they dishabituated to the double object
interpretation. This research demonstrates that infants have an object
concept which, in part, specifies how objects are individuated. This
ability is a prerequisite for the proposed constraint because the
constraint requires children to determine whether the referent is an
object or a non-solid substance. For children to know whether something
is an object, they need, at least, to be able to pick out the objects in
a visio-spatial representation of the world.
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The second consideration is that young children use object words.
Katherine Nelson (1973) has observed that 41% of infants' first 50 words
are, in adult usage, object words. Infants are interested in words whose
meanings are object kinds for adults. However, it is not clear what the
words mean for the infants. They could be shape predicates. "Dog" could
mean dog-shape the way that "round" means round-shape. Shape is relevant
to object kind, but it is not identical. A throne and a bean bag have
very different shapes and yet they are both the same kind of objects,
chairs. Also, these data do not demonstrate how the words were
acquired. We do not know by what possible laborious process the children
arrived at the meanings.
Although it is not always clear what children's words mean, the third
consideration is that children reject meanings for object words that are
clearly not object kind. Markman's and Hutchinson's research (1984) on
the taxonomic constraint demonstrates that children reject thematic
relations as meanings of object words. Baldwin (1986) showed that
children also reject color as the meaning of object words. She labelled
an object with a novel word and then asked which of two other objects was
also a referent of the word. One object had the same form and a
different color and the other object had the opposite features. The
children selected the object of similar form. These findings follow from
the proposed constraint. Again, we do not know if the children thought
3. Huttenlocher & Smiley (1987) claim to have evidence that children
think that object words refer to kinds of objects. However, they also do
not demonstrate the process the children used to arrive at their
meanings.
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that kind of object, form, or something else corresponded to the meanings
of the words. But we do know that they rejected thematic relations and
color as meanings --as required by the proposed constraint.
In contrast to these supporting considerations, Quine (1969) has
argued that the ontological distinction between objects and substances is
not achieved until children have mastered the syntax of individuation and
quantification. If Quine is right, the proposed constraint would not
become available until late in the process of language acquisition.
Children must first learn some nouns through a different means, learn the
count/mass distinction over those nouns, and then learn the distinction
between objects and substances. Only then could they use this constraint
to learn the meanings of other words.
The following experiments were designed to see whether, in fact, the
proposed constraint is used by young children. To review, the constraint
is:
When children hear a new word used to refer to a solid
object, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind
of object. When they hear a new word used to refer to a
non-solid substance, their first hypothesis about its meaning
is the kind of substance.
The first three experiments provide empirical evidence for the
proposed constraint. Subjects were given novel words for novel objects
and novel non-solid substances. The subjects then picked other referents
of the new words. The design enabled an analysis of the constraint based
on the subjects' response patterns. These experiments also addressed the
relationship between syntactic information and the proposed constraint.
The fourth experiment provided evidence for the constraint through an
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examination of spontaneous speech. Predictions follow from the
constraint about which words children can and cannot learn. The relative
use of each kind of word by children in natural environments was found
and compared with the predictions. The fifth and sixth experiments
accepted the constraint and asked different questions. Experiment 5 was
concerned with the issue of scope. That is, the proposed constraint
could be used only to support inferences about word meaning, or it could
be used to support nonlinguistic inferences as well. Finally, the
question of how children determine the kind of an object was examined in
the sixth experiment. Children were tested to see if they considered
various properties to be relevant to the definition of object kind.
Different subjects were used in each experiment.
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EXPERIMENT 1
We contrasted inferences about the meanings of object words with
inferences about the meanings of non-solid substance words. One stimulus
was named. Then two test stimuli were presented and the subjects were
asked to infer which choice had the same name as the original. One
stimulus shared the shape, size, and number of the original, but not its
substance or color. The other shared the number and color of the
original but not the shape size and number (Figure 1). In some trials the
original stimulus was a solid object and in others it was a non-solid
substance (as in gels and powders). In the object trials all test
stimuli were solid objects. In the substance trials all test stimuli
were non-solid substances. We predicted that the subjects would choose
the object of the original shape, size, and number in the object trials
but the substance of the original substance and color in the substance
trials. These results would support both parts of the proposed
constraint for the following reasons. If the basis of the subjects'
inferences varies depending on the referent's ontological type, then the
subjects must be distinguishing those ontological types and using the
distinction in the determination of word meanings. Also, if children's
words mean kind of object when the referent is a solid object and kind of
substance when the referent is a non-solid substance, then children
should project new words onto objects of the same kind and substances of
- 22 -
Figure 1--object and substance tri'als
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the same kind (depending on the original referent) just as predicted
above.
In addition we explored the possible role of count/mass syntax.
There is a rough correspondence between the count/mass distinction and
the object/substance distinction. Objects and count nouns are counted
directly. It makes sense to talk about a single chair or three chairs.
Similarly English enumerates count nouns directly, as in "a chair" or
"three chairs". However, substances and mass nouns must be counted over
portions. To discuss a single water or three waters is meaningless.
Water is not divisible into individual waters. It must be partitioned by
an external metric, as in bowls. Similarly English enumerates mass nouns
over portions, as in "a bowl of water" or "three bowls of water". It is
not the case that all count nouns are object words (e.g. "substance" and
"gel") or that all mass nouns are substance words (e.g. "furniture" and
"jewelry"). Rather, both the syntactic and conceptual systems are
organized around the same distinction in individuation and
quantification. That is, they each have a system for individuating and
quantifying directly and a different system which relies on an external
metric. However, if children assume the stronger correspondence, then
they could use information about either the syntax or the semantics to
infer properties of the other.
One role of count/mass syntax we explored derives from Quine's
argument. According to Quine, infants who have not acquired count/mass
syntax will not be able to use the distinction between objects and
substances to determine word meanings. We tested this claim by analyzing
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the subjects' speech to see whether their production of count/mass syntax
was related to their hypotheses about word meaning. If Quine is right,
then children who do not know count/mass syntax should not differentiate
the object trials from the non-solid substance trials. If Quine is
wrong, then the subjects' knowledge of count/mass syntax should have no
bearing on their inferences about word meaning in these experiments.
A second possible role of count/mass syntax is more direct. Young
children may use information about the subcategorization of a particular
noun to determine the meaning of that noun. This role is orthogonal to
that described above. The possibility that children may use their
representation of a syntactic distinction to acquire a conceptual
distinction is very different from the possibility that children may use
syntactic information about a particular noun to acquire semantic
information about that noun.
Many psychologists have argued that children can use syntax to
constrain inferences about word meaning. Roger Brown (1957) found that 4
and 5-year-olds assume newly heard mass nouns refer to substances and
newly heard count nouns refer to objects. (although see Gathercole,
1986, for a slightly different interpretation). Katz, Baker, and
Macnamara (1974) and S. Gelman and Taylor (1984) have found evidence that
younger children use the distinction between common and proper noun
syntax to constrain word meanings. And Landau and Gleitman (1985) and
Naigles (1986) have argued that children use information about a verb's
syntactic frames to determine the meaning of that verb. In the present
study, we tested whether young children can use the subcategorization of
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a noun to help determine the meaning of that noun by comparing two
conditions. In one the syntax specified the subcategorization of the
noun as either count or mass. In the other neutral syntax was
4
provided. If children do use syntactic cues for determining word
meaning, then the subjects in the selective condition should do better
than the subjects in the neutral condition. If they do not use syntactic
information when making inferences about meaning, then the subjects in
both conditions should do equally well.
Method
SUBJECTS
In each group (neutral and syntax) there were 12 subjects, 6 girls
and 6 boys. Their ages were from 1;10 - 2;3 (mean age, 2;1). They were
recruited from the greater Boston area. Testing was begun with three
other subjects but not finished. These three had no understanding of the
task and could not complete a trial. Testing was conducted at the
subjects' homes. The subjects' parents received $5.00 each for their
participation.
4. Note, however, that in both conditions the syntactic frame of the new
word selected for a noun.
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PROCEDURE AND STIMULI
Two experimenters ran each session. The primary experimenter (Ep)
interacted with the subject and recorded responses. During the test
phase of each trial, the Ep looked at the subject and not the stimuli.
No indication was given as to the appropriateness of the subject's
answers. After each response the Ep gave neutral comments, such as
"O.K. Let's look at some more toys". The same precautions against
experimenter bias were taken in all of the experiments. The other
experimenter (Eo) organized the stimuli. A parent often observed, but
was not involved.
There were two conditions (neutral and syntax) and two types of
trials (object and substance). Condition was a between subjects factor
and trial type was a within subjects factor.
Each testing began with two familiar trials: one object trial and one
substance trial. The purpose of these trials was twofold. First, the
subjects were introduced to the procedure with stimuli that they would
recognize and handle comfortably. Second, the subjects' responses to
these trials demonstrated whether they already knew any object words and
non-solid substance words. The familiar objects were a blue, plastic
cup; a white styrofoam cup; and cup pieces. The non-solid substances
were peanut butter and Play-doh. The two familiar trials were followed
by eight unfamiliar trials: four object and four substance. Eight novel
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words were used: "blicket", "stad", "mell", "coodle", "doff", "tannin",
"fitch", and "tulver".
An Unfamiliar Object Trial In The Neutral Condition
In an object trial the first stimulus presented was an unfamiliar
object (Figure 1). Four different sorts of objects were used: apple
corers (orange plastic and aluminum); plumbing fixtures shaped like a "T"
(copper and white plastic); childhood toys often called cootie catchers
or fortune tellers (orange acetate and silver paper) and honey dippers
(wooden and clear plastic). The objects were given names. The Ep said,
"This is my blicket". The Ep then continued to talk about the object
using "my", "the", and "this" for determiners. She and the S manipulated
the object. The object was placed to the side and two other sets of
objects were presented directly in front of the subject. One set
contained one object that was the same sort of object as the original but
made out of a different material. For example if the original object was
a metal "T", then the second object was a plastic "T". The other set of
objects contained 3 or 4 chunks made of the same material as the original
object. They were small and in arbitrary shapes. In the present
example, they would have been 4 small pieces of metal. The Ep said,
"Point to the blicket".
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A Non-Solid Substance Trial (substance trial) In The Neutral
Condition
Each non-solid substance was presented either in a single pile or in
multiple piles (3 or 4) (Figure 1). The first stimulus presented was a
substance in either of the presentation configurations. The Ep said,
"This is my stad" and referred to the substance using only "my", "the",
and "this" for determiners. The Ep and the S talked about the substance
and played with it. In the presentation of test substances the S was
shown 2 substances: the original and a novel one. The original substance
was in the alternative configuration. The novel substance was in the
configuration used originally with the named substance. The S was told,
"Point to the Stad". There were four pairs of substances: 1) Dippity-do
(a setting gel) and lumpy Nivea (a hand cream mixed with gravel); 2)
coffee (freeze dried) and orzo (a rice shaped pasta); 3) sawdust and
leather (cut into tiny pieces); and 4) Crazy Foam and clay. Of each pair
one member was named and the other was used as the alternative to the
original in the test presentation. Each member served in both roles
across subjects.
The syntax used in the neutral condition did not indicate whether the
new word was a count noun or a mass noun, only that it was a noun.
However, if the subjects knew both count/mass syntax and its relation to
objects and substances, then there were trials in the neutral condition
in which the syntax gave evidence about the referent. Specifically, the
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substance trials in which the original substance was presented in
multiple piles were of this sort. For example, "This is my glass" is
nonselective. However, if the referent is many pieces of glass, then
"glass" must be being used as a mass noun because only mass nouns are
used with singular verbs when referring to multiple items. 5
Object And Substance Trials In The Syntax Condition
In the syntax condition the determiners used when naming the original
stimulus were selective for either count nouns or mass nouns. Otherwise
the syntax trials were identical to the neutral trials, including the
test question ("Point to the blicket"). In a syntax condition object
trial the introductory statement by the Ep was "This is a blicket". The
Ep used "a blicket" and "another blicket" in subsequent naming. In a
substance trial in the syntax condition the Ep said, "This is stad". The
Ep continued to omit determiners or use "some". These determiners were
chosen because, in production, they are among the earliest selective
determiners used by 2-year-olds (Gordon, 1982). Also, in comprehension,
3-year-olds can determine the subcategorization of a noun based on its
5. Collection nouns are also used with singular verbs and refer to
multiple items. Yet collection nouns do not have to be mass nouns. For
example, "family" is a count noun that is used with a singular verb to
refer to multiple items in the sentence: "Everyone in the family is
here". If the subjects interpret the noun as a collection count noun and
think that count nouns refer to objects, then they would do worse on the
substance trials in which the substance is originally presented in
multiple small piles. In contrast, if they interpret the noun as a mass
noun and think that mass nouns refer to substances, then they would do
better on those trials.
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previous occurrence with one of these determiners (Gordon, 1985).
The following items were counterbalanced: the order of object and
substance trials (S,O,O,S,S,O,O,S,S,O or 0,S,S,O,O,S,S,O,O,S); the side
of the correct response (R,L,R,R,L,L,R,R,L,L); the order of object types
and substance types (e.g., ["T", corer] or [corer, "T"] and [Nivea, orzo]
or [orzo, Nivea]); name - stimulus pairings (e.g., ["blicket" - "T"] or
["blicket" - orzo]); the specific object introduced within each object
type (e.g., plastic or metal "T"); and the type of substance introduced
within each substance pair (e.g., Dippity-do or Nivea).
Each subject was tested in two sessions. The two sessions were
identical. There is evidence that the subjects treated the trials of the
second session as independent from those in the first session. The
probability of a correct response of trial Y in the second session given
a subject's response on trial X in the first session was the same whether
X = Y or X =/= Y (details of the analysis are in Appendix 1). This result
does not imply that there was no consistency in the subjects' responses.
In fact, if the subjects got trial X right in the first session, there
was an 80% - 85% chance they would get trial Y right in the second
session. The point is that it did not matter whether trials X and Y were
the same or different. Their response to trial Y in the second session
was not affected by their having experienced that particular trial in the
first session.
The scoring was based on the following reasoning. The hypothesis is
that the basis of children's inferences about word meaning depends on the
ontological type of the referent. Evidence for this hypothesis would be
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provided if the subjects' projections varied depending on the ontological
kind of the original referent. It was predicted that the subjects
responses would support the hypothesis in the following way. In the
object trials the subjects would think that the word referred to the
object kind, ignoring changes in substance and color. And in the
substance trials they would think that the word referred to substance
kind, ignoring changes in size, number and shape.
Accordingly responses will be called "correct" if the choice matching
shape and number is chosen in the object trials, and the choice matching
substance is chosen in the non-solid substance trials. An object score
and a substance score were found for each subject. Each score was the
sum of correct responses on trials of the appropriate type.
Before and after testing the Ep played with the S. The entire period
of involvement with the S was tape recorded. The play periods included
reading books, playing with marbles, and talking. The subjects' noun
phrases during the play periods were transcribed and organized according
to noun subcategorization.6 Occasionally during the test period the Ss
spontaneously talked about a topic unrelated to the testing. The noun
phrases from these productions were also transcribed and analyzed. The
6. Many nouns have both count and mass interpretations. For example,
"chicken" is used equally well as a mass noun, "Is there more chicken?",
and as a count noun, "We have three chickens". However, there are other
mass nouns that are used in count noun syntax, but the noun is not really
a count noun. For example, "milk" can be used with mass noun syntax, "I
want some more milk", or with count noun syntax, "This table needs three
milks". But in the second sentence "three milks" is used elliptically to
mean "three glasses of milk". The subjects' use of truly ambiguous nouns
were not included in the analyses. The other nouns were included.
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percents of types and tokens used in selective syntactic frames were
calculated. The syntactic frames, or configurations, used were "a
(noun)", "(noun)s", "some (noun)s", "the (noun)s", "(noun)" and "some
(noun)". The first four select for count nouns, and the last two select
for mass nouns. However, the percents of occurrences were calculated for
all noun types in all frame types.
Competence with count/mass syntax can be defined in different ways.
One definition is that competence is achieved when the child's use of
determiners and plural endings differs depending on the noun-type. When
children achieve this level of competence, they are using two different
systems of individuation and quantification. It is this aspect of the
count/mass distinction that corresponds to the object/substance
distinction and that is relevant to Quine's argument. Therefore, a
syntax score was found for each subject that reflected their ability to
use determiners and plural endings differentially for the two kinds of
nouns.
Results
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Familiar Data
The familiar trials used cups and peanut butter and Play-dot. The
subjects in the neutral group got 96% of the familiar object trials
correct and 83% of the familiar substance trials correct. The subjects
in the syntax group got 79% of the familiar object trials correct and 83%
correct of the familiar substance trials correct. Chance is 50%. In
Figure 2 the results are graphed as the percent of trials by shape minus
50. Therefore, the object score is represented as (object score - 50) but
the substance score is represented as ((100 - substance score) - 50).
Points above 0 indicate that the subjects chose the stimulus of the
original shape, as predicted for the object trials. Points below 0
indicate that the subjects chose the stimulus of the original substance,
as predicted for the substance trials. The further a point is from the 0
in either direction, the further it is from chance.
A 2-way repeated measure analysis of variance was carried out on the
number of correct trials (i.e., not on the kind of score shown in Figure
2). It compared group (neutral x syntax) X trial type (object x
substance). None of the main-effects or interactions were significantly
different from chance (all F's < .79, p's > .39). The subjects were
better than chance on both kinds of trials (object: t(23) = 8.351, p <
.0000002, 2-tailed; substance: t(23) = 5.826, p < .00001, 2-tailed).
That is, they did equally well in the object trials and the substance
trials and chose the correct answer in each case more often than chance.
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Figure 2 - Difference from Chance on Familiar Object
Trials and Familiar Substance Trials for the Neutral and Syntax Groups
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Unfamiliar Data
The subjects in the neutral group did 93% of the object trials
correctly and 76% of the substance trials correctly. The subjects in the
syntax group did 94% of the object trials correctly and 63% of the
substance trials correctly (Figure 3). Chance is 50%.
A 2-way repeated measure anova compared trial type (o x s) X group
(neutral x syntax). The only significant effect was trial type (F(1,22)
= 25.578, p < .00005; all other F's < 1.8, ps > .2). The performance
was better on the object trials than the substance trials. Performance
on both the object trials and the substance trials was significantly
better than chance (object: t(23) = 23.3, p < .0000002, 2-tailed;
substance: t(23) = 3.6, p < .002, 2-tailed).
A separate anova compared the substance trials in which the substance
was named in one big pile and the trials in which it was named in 3 or 4
small piles. There was not a significant difference (F(1,22) = .226, p =
.64). Various other analyses were done comparing session, sex, stimulus
item, stimulus order, and coding sheet. None of these effects were
significantly different from chance (all F's < 2.2, p's > .15).
In sum, the children chose according to object type when the stimulus
was an object and according to substance type when the stimulus was a
non-solid substance. However, they were more consistent when the
stimulus was a solid object than when it was a non-solid substance. They
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Figure 3- Difference from Chance on LUnfamilor Object
Triels and Unfamilir Substance Trials for the Neutral and Syntax Groups
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were neither facilitated nor hindered by the additional syntactic
information.
Production Data
Productive competence was assessed for 22 of the 24 subjects. One
subject was not yet talking and therefore had no productions to assess.
Another subject had a cold --which greatly affected his desire to talk,
but not his desire to do the experiment, which all children found fun.
On average the subjects used 67 count noun tokens and 7 mass noun
tokens. 82% of the count nouns were singular. Of those, 57% were used
with no determiner, 28% were used with "a", and 15% were used with
"the". 80% of the plural count nouns were used with no determiner. 75%
of the mass nouns were used with no determiner and 15% were used with
"the". 73% of the mass noun types were non-solid substance words. 56%
of those were food words. None of the mass noun types were solid
substance words (e.g., "metal", "plastic", etc.).
For each subject the difference between the percent of count nouns
used with count noun syntax and the percent of mass nouns used with count
noun syntax was found. Also the difference between the percent of mass
nouns used with mass noun syntax and the percent of count nouns used with
mass noun syntax was found. The sum of the two differences was the
subjects syntax score. The scores can range from -200 to 200. However,
96% of the errors were count nouns used without any determiners, rather
- 38 -
than either kind of noun used with inappropriate determiners. And mass
noun syntax allows determiners to be omitted. Therefore since the only
errors are errors of omission (which are count nouns used in mass noun
syntax) you might expect the lowest scores to be 0 ((0 - 0) + (100 -
100)). However, the subjects also used nouns in nonselective sentence
frames, such as "the cat" or "the mud". These uses were not included in
the computation of a syntax score. Therefore, if the subjects used more
mass nouns in nonselective syntax than count nouns, they could get
negative scores. For example, one subject had a score of -24. 2% of his
count nouns were used with count noun syntax and 92% were used with mass
noun syntax (omitting determiners). 0% of his mass nouns were used with
count noun syntax and 66% were used with mass noun syntax. However, 33%
of his mass nouns and 4% of his count nouns were used with neutral
syntax. Therefore, his score is (2 - 0) + (66 - 92) = -24. Low scores,
even negative scores, indicate a lack of differentiation between count
and mass syntax. The higher the score is (above 0), the greater is the
differentiation.
It is worth noting that improvement on this score is basically
equivalent to improvement on the use of count noun syntax because 96% of
the errors are errors of omission. In fact, each subject, on average,
only made errors with 7% of the mass noun tokens compared to 48% of the
count noun tokens.
The syntax scores ranged from -67 to 163. The neutral and syntax
groups did not differ with respect to this score. The mean for the
neutral group was 44 and the mean for the syntax group was 65 (F(1,20) =
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.6, p = .45).
A difference score based on the subject's ability to differentiate
object and substance trials was also found for each subject. It was the
difference between the percent of responses based on shape and number in
the object trials (correct responses) and the same percent in the
substance trials (incorrect responses). These scores ranged from 0 to
100. The correlation coefficient between the two kinds of difference
scores (syntactic and semantic) is not significantly different from
chance (r = .07, p > .7, 2-tailed).
The syntax scores were also used to separate the group of subjects
into two groups according to count/mass proficiency. The median
production score was used to divide the group. The effect of the syntax
condition was then reevaluated using only the subjects who had the higher
syntax scores. There were 5 subjects in the neutral group and six
subjects in the syntax group. The neutral group did 93% of the object
trials correctly and 68% of the substance trials correctly. The syntax
group did 94% of the object trials correctly and 68% of the substance
trials correctly (Figure 4). An anova comparing trial type X group
revealed a significant effect of trial type only (F(1,9) = 10.6, p = .01;
all other F's < .02, p's > .9).
In sum, there were three results. First, there was no difference in
production skill between the neutral and syntax groups. Second, the
ability to differentiate count/mass syntax did not correlate with the
ability to differentiate objects from non-solid substances. Third, the
subjects who were most skilled at count/mass syntax did not benefit in
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Figure 4 -- Difference from Chance on Unfamiliar Object Trials
and Unfamiliar Substance Trials for the Subjects in the Neutral and Syntax
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the word learning task from the presence of selective syntax.
Discussion
The hypothesis was that children use this constraint when making
inferences about word meaning:
When children hear a new word used to refer to a solid
object, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind
of object. When they hear a new word used to refer to a
non-solid substance, their first hypothesis about its meaning
is the kind of substance.
This constraint has two parts:
Basis Inferences about word meaning are based on the
ontological kind of the referent, at least for the
kinds solid object and non-solid substance.
Inference The first hypotheses about word meanings are kind of
object and kind of substance (depending on the
ontological kind of the original referent, as stated
above).
The results from this experiment support both parts of this constraint.
Basis
The subjects were given a task in which they were told the name of
one stimulus and then asked which of two other stimuli shared the name.
The two other stimuli had either the same shape or the same substance as
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the original but not both. The basis of the subjects' inferences varied
depending on whether the original referent was a solid object or a
non-solid substance. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
the subjects' inferences were based on ontological type.
Two claims about the role of syntax bear on this part of the
constraint. First, Quine (1969) has argued that children learn the
ontological distinction between objects and substances through the use of
syntactic means of individuation and quantification. It follows from
this position that only children who are using count/mass syntax should
have a pattern of projection in this experiment indicating the use of the
ontological distinction. However, even though many of the subjects were
not using count/mass syntax at all, there was no correlation between use
of the syntax and performance in this experiment. These results are in
contrast to the prediction based on Quine's position. The ontological
distinction between objects and substances is not learned through the
syntactic distinction between count and mass nouns.
The second claim about syntax is that children use count/mass syntax
as the basis of inferences about word meaning. - A constraint with a
syntactic base might look like this:
When children hear a new word that is used in count noun
syntax, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind
of object. When they hear a new word that is used in mass
noun syntax, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the
kind of substance.
If children use this syntactic constraint, then those who are given the
subcategorization of the noun should do better in this experiment than
children who were not given that information. No such benefit was
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observed. That is, there was no difference in performance between the
7
syntax and neutral groups. This result is not surprising with the
object trials since both groups were at ceiling. However, neither group
was at ceiling in the substance trials and there was no difference
between the groups with these trials either.
Also, there was no difference between performance on the substance
trials in which the named substance was in one big pile or in multiple
small piles. These latter trials gave added syntactic information since
mass nouns, but not count nouns, are used with singular verbs to refer to
more than one item at the same time.
It could be argued that many of the subjects did not know count/mass
syntax yet and therefore could not be expected to benefit from its
presence. To explore this possibility, we analyzed separately the
performance of just those children who were best at count/mass syntax.
This subgroup of subjects also did not show a benefit from the presence
of syntactic information.
These data contrast those from other experiments that demonstrate
children's use of syntax to constrain inferences about word meaning
(Brown, 1957; S. Gelman & Taylor, 1984; Katz, Baker, and Macnamara, 1974;
Naigles, 1986). In some of them the subjects were older than two years.
In others, the syntactic and semantic distinctions were different from
the ones investigated here. My argument is not that syntax is never used
7. There was a nonsignificant difference between the two groups on the
familiar object trials, but in the wrong direction.
- 44 -
as a source of constraint on possible word meanings. Rather, I suggest
that count/mass syntax is not used by two-year-olds in deciding whether a
word refers to a kind of object or a kind of substance.
In sum, the basis of inferences about the meanings of object and
non-solid substance words appears to be the ontological kind of the
referent. Syntactic information is not used as the basis of the
acquisition of the ontological distinction or as the basis of inferences
about the meanings of these kinds of words.
Inference
The inference part of the constraint is:
When children hear a new word used to refer to an object,
their first hypothesis about its meanings is the kind of
object. When they hear a new word used to refer to a
non-solid substance their first hypothesis about its meaning
is the kind of substance.
The subjects' projections of word meanings were consistent with the
proposed inferences. In selecting another referent of the word, they
chose another object of the original object kind when the stimulus was
solid and another substance of the original substance kind when the
stimulus was non-solid. However, they were more consistent in the case
of objects than non-solid substances. This difference does not negate
the conclusion that they chose the substance or the original substance
kind in the substance trials more often than chance. However, it is
worth investigating the cause of the difference. Recall that the
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subjects did as well with the familiar non-solid substance words as with
the familiar object words. Therefore, it may be that they are as capable
of learning non-solid substance words as object words, but need more
exposure to the non-solid substance words to get to the same level of
competence. This could be because they have a bias to think that common
nouns refer to objects. However, it could also be an artifact of this
procedure. They may have had a bias to pick single things. In the
object trials, the single object was always the correct object. In the
substance trials, the single pile of substance was only correct half of
the time. The fact that subjects were equally correct for single or
multiple piles of a substance suggests that a single-object bias was not
present. Nonetheless, it seemed worth testing the possibility more
systematically (see Experiment 2).
The data are inconsistent with two other possible constraints:
1. When children hear a new word, their first hypothesis
about its meaning is the function of the referents.
This is a reformulated version of Katherine Nelson's (1974) claim. The
actions that the subject and experimenter did with each of the stimuli
could have been done equally well with any of them. For example, any of
the objects or non-solid substances were things that could be viewed,
dropped, touched and smelled. The subjects may have imagined functions
for the objects that could not have been functions of the pieces in the
object trials. However, in the substance trials, both substances of a
pair could have been used in the same ways. Therefore, the subjects
could not have been inferring the referents' functions as the meanings of
the words.
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2. When children hear a new word, their first hypothesis
about its meaning is the shape of the referents.
The subjects did choose the object of the original shape. But, this
constraint can not be right because in the substance trials they rejected
the substance in the original shape.
However, more specific constraints selecting shape as the meaning of
a word may be possible. The following constraint is as consistent with
the data as is our proposed constraint.
When children hear a new word used to refer to a solid
object, their first hypothesis about its meaning is its
shape.
The inference about object words is shape rather than object kind.
However, shape is often relevant to the kind of an object and therefore
the two properties (shape and kind) are not independent. In contrast,
shape is not relevant to the kind of a substance. Furthermore, the
subjects recognized this difference in the relevancy of shape, as
demonstrated through their differential responding to the object and
substance trials. Subjects may think that the meaning of an object word
is shape because of the relationship between shape and kind with respect
to objects. Of, they may think that the meaning of an object word is the
object kind.
Given either possibility the proposed constraint further delimits the
set of possible word meanings given by the taxonomic constraint. The
taxonomic constraint selects any taxonomic classification of a referent
as the meaning of a word. The proposed constraint selects kind of object
and kind of substance as the meanings of words, over the other taxonomic
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classifications. It achieves this power by differentiating kinds of
taxonomic kinds and marking only some of them as possible word meanings.
In Experiment 2 two alternative explanations for the results of
Experiment 1 are investigated. The first alternative concerns a
distinction between the two kinds of trials that was ignored in this
experiment. The, second addresses an issue that was raised in the
discussion. That is, it investigates whether the subjects' difficulty
with the substance trials is due to a bias to pick single things.
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EXPERIMENT 2
I have interpreted the data from Experiment 1 as supporting the claim
that 2-year-olds use the ontological kind of the referent in constraining
inferences about the meaning of a newly heard word. There are, however,
alternative explanations for the data. Another difference between the
two kinds of trials, besides ontological kind, could have been
responsible for the pattern of response. The objects had complex shapes
and the non-solid substances were put into simple piles. A plausible
constraint that could account for the data is:
When children hear a new word, their first hypothesis about
its meaning is the most salient perceptual property of the
referent.
This constraint follows from Eve Clark's (1973) early work on word
meanings. She claimed that children's words had as meanings combinations
of salient perceptual properties of the word's referents. In the first
experiment, shape was likely to be the most salient perceptual property
of the referents in the object trials. Therefore, according to this
constraint, shape would have been chosen as the meaning of the object
words. In contrast, since the shape of the non-solid substances was
simple, it was not likely to be the most salient perceptual property of
the referents in the substance trials. Rather, color or texture may have
been the most salient perceptual property; and therefore, according to
this constraint, would have been chosen as the meaning of the non-solid
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substance words. The results would have been the same, but the reason
would be differences in shape complexity rather than ontological kind.
This constraint was tested in Experiment 2. The original procedure
was used with new stimuli. The objects had simple shapes and the
substances were put into piles with complex shapes. Ratings from adults
were used to insure that the object shapes were not more complex than the
substance shapes.
If the results of Experiment 2 follow the same pattern as the results
of Experiment 1, then the constraint based on ontological kind will be
supported. On the other hand, if the adult ratings on shape complexity
predict the results, then the constraint based on shape complexity will
be supported.
A second alternative explanation of the results of Experiment 1 is
that children simply like to reach for whole things. This bias could not
explain the results on the substance trials because the single pile was
only correct half of the time. Therefore, it also does not account for
the subjects' differentiation of objects and non-solid substances.
However, it could explain the results on the object trials.
This bias was tested in a control condition of Experiment 2. The
stimuli from the naming task were used with a new procedure. The
subjects were given the test stimuli, in the absence of the naming event,
and were asked to pick one of the choices. If the subjects are affected
by this response bias, then they should choose the single object and the
single pile of non-solid substance. If, also, they respond similarly in
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the naming task as they did in Experiment 1, then the bias could explain
two results. First, it could account for the subjects' success on the
object trials. Second, it could explain the subjects' relative
difficulty with the substance trials compared to the object trials.
Method
SUBJECTS
There were 12 subjects, 6 males and 6 females, in each group. The
mean ages were 2;1 (range: 1;10 -2;3) for the neutral group, 2;0 (range:
1;10 - 2;3) for the syntax group, and 2;2 (range 2;1 - 2;2) for the
control group. They were tested at their homes and their parents were
paid $5.00 each for their participation.
The adult subjects were 12 MIT undergraduates.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
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Naming Task
The familiar objects were plastic and styrofoam cups, as in
Experiment 1. The novel objects were made into the following forms:
pyramids (wood and blue Super Sculpey 8 ) pancakes (yellow wax and green
plastic), kidneys (orange wax and purple plaster), and half eggs (grey
styrofoam and red Super Sculpey). The familiar and novel non-solid
substances were the same as in Experiment 1. The shapes are shown in
Appendix 2. Note that the coffee/orzo and sawdust/leather pairs had
simple piles for the multiple shapes. Those materials do not stay in
small, complex shapes. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.
Adult Ratings
Line drawings were made of each novel stimulus. Each object kind had
two drawings: one of itself and one of its pieces. The Crazy Foam/clay
and the Nivea/Dippity Do substance pairs each also had two drawings: one
of the large shape and one of the small shapes. The coffee/orzo and the
sawdust/leather pairs only had drawings of the large shape since the
8. Super Sculpey is a sculpting material, somewhat similar to clay.
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small shapes were just simple piles. Each object drawing was paired
with the drawing of each substance in its large shape, resulting in 16
pairings. Each of the four drawings of the object pieces were paired
with the two drawings of the substances in their small shapes, making
another 8 pairings. Each pairing was on a separate sheet of a book. No
drawing appeared on consecutive pages. The sides of the pictures were
counterbalanced such that on half of the pages the object drawing was on
the right side and on half of the pages it was on the left side. Each
subject was tested individually. They read the instructions in Appendix
3 and then used a separate answer sheet to indicate which drawing in each
pair they thought was more complex.
Control Condition
The subjects may have had idiosyncratic preferences for certain
familiar things besides a general bias to pick whole things. We did not
want them to develop obscure strategies for this task by generalizing
from their preferences for known things. Therefore, we did not use any
familiar stimuli.
The novel stimuli were the same as in the naming task. The subjects
were shown the test pairs and asked "Which of these would you like to
9. If line drawings had been made of the small shapes and compared with
the drawings of the object pieces, the substance shapes may well have
been rated as less complex than the object pieces for those substances.
An item analysis of the non-solid substances will reveal whether the
simplicity of those substance piles had an effect.
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play with?" There was no naming event.
Results
ADULT RATINGS
The subjects chose the substance drawing as having the more complex
shape in 97% of the large shape pairs and 79% of the small shape pairs.
A difference score was found for each subject by subtracting the number
of pairs in which the object drawing was chosen from the number of pairs
in which the substance drawing was chosen. This score could range from
-24 to 24. A 0 means that the subject chose objects and substances
equally often. A negative score indicates that the subject chose more
object drawings than substance drawings. A positive score indicates that
the subject chose more substance drawings than object drawings. The
average score was 19.8 which is significantly greater than 0 (t(11) =
15.967, p < .001, 2-tailed). No score was less than 8. A difference
score can also be found for each pair by subtracting the number of people
choosing the object drawing from the number of people choosing the
substance drawing. These scores can range from -12 to 12. A 0 means that
the object drawing and substance drawing of that pair were chosen equally
often. A negative score means that the object was chosen most often and
a positive score means that the substance was chosen most often. The
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mean score was 9.9 which is significantly greater than 0 (t(23) = 11.264,
p < .001, 2-tailed). One score was -6, one was 0, and the scores of the
other 22 pairs were greater than 8.
In sum, each substance was chosen more often than each object. Also,
each subject chose substances more often than objects. The substances
had more complex shapes than the objects.
NAMING TASK
Familiar Data
The subjects in the neutral condition were correct in 83% of the
object trials and 83% of the substance trials. The subjects in the
syntax condition were correct in 88% of the object trials and 80% of the
substance trials (Figure 5). A two-way ANOVA was done comparing trial
type (object x substance) X group (neutral x syntax). None of the main
effects or interactions were significant (all F's < 1.53, p's > .59).
The subjects were better than chance on both the object and substance
scores (object: t(20) = 6.423, p < .000005, 2-tailed; substance: t(20) =
5.691, p < .00002, 2-tailed).
In sum, the subjects were better than chance on the cup and peanut
butter/Play-Doh trials and performed equally well on both kinds of
trials. The neutral and syntax groups did not differ from each other.
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Figure 5 -- Difference fror Chance on Familiar Object Trials and
Familiar Substance Trials for the Neutral and Syntax Groups
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Unfamiliar Data
The subjects in the neutral group did 93% of the object trials
correctly and 62% of the substance trials correctly. The subjects in the
syntax group did 86% of the object trials correctly and 69% of the
substance trials correctly (Figure 6). A two-way ANOVA comparing trial
type (object x substance) X group (neutral x syntax) revealed a
significant trial type main effect (F(1,22) = 14.754, p = .001). The
group main effect (F(1,22) = .004, p = .95) and interaction (F(1,22) =
1.449, p = .241) were not significant. The subjects were better than
chance on the object trials (t(22) = 8.947, p < .0000002, 2-tailed) and
better than chance on the substance trials (t(22) = 3.441, p < .005,
2-tailed).
A three-way ANOVA was then done that added the factor, session (1 x
2), into the previous analysis. There were no additional main effects,
but there was a session x trial type interaction (F(1,22) = 5.955, p =
.023). The mean score in the first session was 92% for objects and 59%
for substances. The mean score in the second session was 86% for objects
and 71% for substances (Figure 7). A Newman-Keuls test revealed that the
interaction is due to a significant difference between the sessions on
the substance trials, but not the object trials. It also showed the
trial type main effect.
A three-way ANOVA was conducted comparing experiment (1 x 2) X trial
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Figure 6 -- Difference from Chance on Unfamilir Object Trials and
Unfamilier Substance Triels for the Neutral and Syntax Groups
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type (object x substance) X session (1 x 2). There was a trial type main
effect (F(1,46) = 36.012, p < .001) and an interaction involving all
three factors (F(1,46) = 6.409, p = .015). The improvement across
sessions for the substance trials only occurred in Experiment 2. All
other p's > .13. Another three-way ANOVA comparing experiment X trial
type X group revealed only the trial type main effect.
A t-test on the effects of substance configuration (one big pile x
3/4 small piles) found a one-tailed significant difference (t(22) =
1.686, p = .053, 1-tailed). The mean scores were 55% for the single pile
and 70% for the multiple small piles. Because the subjects improved on
the substance trials across sessions, the effect of configuration was
analyzed for each session independently. In the first session the mean
scores were 48% for the single pile and 70% for the multiple piles. This
difference was significant (t(22) = 2.11, p = .046, 2-tailed). In the
second session the mean scores were 63% for the single pile and 69% for
the multiple piles. This difference was not significant (t(22) = .666, p
= .512, 2-tailed). All means except the mean for the single pile in the
first session were significantly greater than chance; however, the mean
for the single pile in the second session was only marginally greater
(single pile, first session: t(23) = .228, p > .8, 2-tailed; multiple
piles, first session: t(23) = 2.853, p < .01, 2-tailed; single pile,
second session: t(23) = 1.651, p = .058, 1-tailed; multiple piles, second
session: t(23) = 3.193, p < .005, 2-tailed).
The mean on the substance trials in which the named substance was in
multiple simple piles was 63%. The mean on the substance trials in which
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the named substance was in multiple complex piles was 77%. These means
cannot be compared statistically because the subjects did not receive
each item in both types of piles. Therefore, although this factor was
within subjects, there were insufficient data from each subject to meet
the requirements of a parametric test such as the analysis of variance.
In any case, the difference is in a direction opposite to the shape
complexity hypothesis. In the trials in which the named substance was in
multiple piles the subjects did better with the substances that had
complex shapes than with the substances that had simple shapes. There
were no effects of trial number, coding sheet, items, or sex (all F's <
1.6, p's > .22).
In sum, the subjects were better than chance on both the object
trials and the substance trials, although they again did better with the
objects than with the substances. There was no difference between the
neutral and syntax groups. The subjects improved across sessions on the
substance trials, but not on the object trials. This effect was only
present in Experiment 2, not Experiment 1. Also, in the first session but
not in the second session the subjects found the substance trials in
which the substances were named in multiple piles easier than when they
were named in a single pile.
Production Data
The subjects used an average of 111 count nouns tokens and 18 mass
nouns tokens. Of the count nouns 86% were singular and 11% were plural.
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Of the singular count nouns 71% were used with no determiner, 22% were
used with "a", and 7% were used with "the". Of the plural count nouns
81% were used with no determiner. 87% of the mass nouns were also used
with no determiner and 3% were used with "the". 90% of the mass noun
types were non-solid substance words. 59% of those were food words.
None of the mass noun types were solid substance words (e.g., "metal",
"plastic", etc.).
A syntax score was found for 22 of the subjects. The other two
subjects were not included due to recording difficulties. The score,
calculated as in Experiment 1, indicates how well the subjects
differentiated count nouns from mass nouns. As in Experiment 1, most of
the errors were errors of omission (97%). On average, the subjects made
errors with 5% of their mass noun tokens and 61% of their count nouns
tokens.
The scores ranged from 10 to 148. The mean score was 58 overall, 49
for the neutral group, and 65 for the syntax group. The performance of
the two groups did not differ (F(1,20) = .906, p = .352).
A semantic score was also found for each subject, as in Experiment 1.
This score indicates how well each subject differentiated the two kinds
of trials. The scores ranged from 8 to 100 (mean: 56). The correlation
between the syntax and semantic scores was not significant (r = .10, p >
.6, 2-tailed).
The naming results of the subjects who were better than the median on
the syntax score were analyzed separately. There were 6 subjects in the
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neutral group and 5 subjects in the syntax group. The subjects in the
neutral group did 98% of the object trials correctly and 61% of the
substance trials correctly. The subjects in the syntax group did 85% of
the object trials correctly and 73% of the substance trials correctly
(Figure 8). A two-way anova comparing group by trial type was done. The
main effect of trial type was significant (F(1,9) = 4.791, p = .056), but
the other effects were not (group: F(1,9) = .002, p = .963; interaction:
F(1,9) = 1.085, p = .325).
Thus the three results from Experiment 1 are replicated in Experiment
2. First, the neutral and syntax groups did not differ with respect to
count/mass production. Second, the subjects' ability to differentiate
object trials from substance trials was not correlated with their ability
to produce count/mass syntax even though many of the subjects did not yet
make the count/mass distinction. Third, even the subjects who were most
proficient with count/mass syntax did not use it to constrain word
meanings.
CONTROL CONDITION
A "whole object" score and a "whole substance" score were found for
each subject. The whole object score was the percent of object trials in
which the subject chose the single object. This kind of response would
have been a correct answer in the naming task. The whole substance score
was the percent of substance trials in which the subject chose the single
pile of substance. This kind of response could have been correct or
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Figure 8 - Difference from Chance on Unfamiliar Object Trials and
Unfamiliar Substance Trials for the Subjects in the Neutral and Syntax
Groups whose Syntax Scores were Above the Median
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incorrect in the naming task depending on the trial.
The average whole object score was 65% and the average whole
substance score was 60% (Figure 9). These two means did not differ
significantly from each other (t(11) = .51, p = .62, 2-tailed).
Therefore, they were combined in the comparison with chance. The
combined whole response was greater than chance (t(23) = 2.672, p < .02,
2-tailed).
The mean for the whole object scores (65%) was also compared to the
mean on the object trials in the naming task (89%). These means are
significantly different (t(34) = 4.11, p < .0005, 2-tailed).
In sum, although there was a slight bias to select the whole item, it
was the same for objects and substances. Furthermore, the presence of a
naming event greatly increased the tendency to pick the whole object.
Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether a constraint
based on ontological kind or a constraint based on shape complexity was
responsible for the results of Experiment 1. The former constraint is
stated as:
When children hear a new word used to refer to a solid
object, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind
of object. When they hear a word used to refer to a
non-solid substance, their first hypothesis is the kind of
substance.
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Figure 9 -- Difference from Chance on Object Trials and
Substane Trials
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A plausible constraint based on shape complexity, inspired by Eve Clark
(1973), is stated as:
When children hear a new word, their first hypothesis about
its meaning is the most salient perceptual property of the
referent.
The results of Experiment 2 support the ontological constraint. In
Experiment 2 the substances had more complicated shapes than the
objects. In Experiment 1 the objects had more complicated shapes. Yet,
the results from the two experiments were practically superimposable. On
the other hand, salient perceptual features did have a small effect on
the subjects' inferences about non-solid substance words. It took the
children some experience with the substance trials to recognize that the
words had substance kind as their meanings. This delay was especially
evident in the trials in which the named substance was in one big pile;
that is, the trials in which the substance was most perceptually similar
to an object. On those trials in the first session, even though the
subjects could touch and manipulate the substances, they still were
unsure of the words' meanings. When the substances were in small piles
and could not be interpreted as a single object, the subjects knew that
the substance kind was relevant. However, the effect of salient
perceptual properties was weak. In the first session the subjects were
at chance. They were not choosing the alternative with the same shape as
the named substance. Also, the subjects were basing their responses on
substance kind more often than chance by the second session, even in the
trials in which the named substance was in a single pile. In sum, the
subjects' responses were based on ontological kind, but they were weakly
affected by an inappropriate salient perceptual property, shape.
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This experiment also replicated the count/mass findings of Experiment
1. The subjects did not learn the ontological distinction through the
count/mass distinction. They also did not use count/mass syntax to help
constrain word meanings. The effect of substance configuration could be
taken as counterevidence to that conclusion. However, that
interpretation of the effect seems inappropriate. First, the effect was
only in the first session. Why would the subjects lose a sensitivity
with more experience? Second, the effect was not found in Experiment 1.
The only difference between the two experiments in the substance trials
was in the shapes of the substances. It seems that this difference in
stimuli is probably the cause of the difference in results, as discussed
above.
Experiment 2 also examined the role of a possible response bias
leading to the results of Experiment 1. The subjects may have been
selecting the whole object in the object trials because they preferred
reaching for whole things more than collections of things. However,
although there did appear to be a slight bias in the control task, it
could not account for the data in the naming task. First, the bias was
not significantly different for objects and non-solid substances in the
control. But in the naming task, the subjects' responses differed
depending on the trial type. Second, the subjects did not pick the whole
object nearly as often in the control as they did in the naming task. On
the other hand, it is possible that this bias is partly responsible for
the subjects' relative difficulty with the non-solid substance words in
the naming task since it would have worked in the appropriate direction
in the object trials, but not in the substance trials.
- 67 -
 _111___ _
In Experiment 3 older subjects were tested to see if they also find
the substance trials harder than the object trials and to see if they can
use selective syntax as a source of information about word meaning.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 show that young children project word meanings on
the basis of the ontological kind of the referents of the word. However,
there is still a question as to whether children can use information
about count/mass subcategorization to constrain inferences about word
meanings. It could be that children use both ontological information and
syntactic information when acquiring new word meanings. In experiments 1
and 2 the lack of a difference between the neutral and syntax groups may
have been due to the subjects' ignorance about count/mass syntax.
Subjects who represent the relevant syntactic knowledge may be able to
use it to constrain word meanings.
Gordon (1982) has shown that certain children were sensitive to the
distributional properties of the determiners "a", "another", numerals,
and plurals by the end of their first year or the beginning of their
10
second year. They understood the more subtle distinction that
determiners are obligatory for singular count nouns, but not plural count
nouns or mass nouns, between 2 1/2 and 3-years. Moreover, Dickinson (in
press) has shown that 3-year-olds are at ceiling on the substance trials
of the neutral condition of Experiment 1. Consequently, subjects of this
10. Gathercole (1986) argues that Gordon has conflicting results and that
two-year-olds do not yet represent count/mass syntax at all. However,
Gordon (1982) effectively defends his original claim.
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age or older could not improve on the substance trials, given the
addition of syntax, regardless of their representational and processing
capacities. Therefore, 2 1/2-year-olds were tested in Experiment 3. All
of the subjects should have commanded some basic distributional
properties that distinguish count nouns from mass nouns and would have
had more time than the 2-year-olds to determine the relationship between
syntax and semantics. Also, some of the subjects should have represented
the role of obligatory determiners in the count/mass distinction.
The results of Experiment 3 will also indicate more clearly the
developmental pattern of the subjects on the substance trials.
2-year-olds are just better than chance and 3-year-olds are at ceiling
(Dickinson, in press). This experiment will demonstrate whether the
improvement is gradual across the second year or sudden.
Method
SUBJECTS
There were 2 groups of 12 subjects. The mean age was 2;7 (range: 2;5
- 2;9) in each group. One other subject was dropped. He could not
complete a single trial. The groups were evenly distributed across sex.
The subjects' parents were paid $5.00 for their participation. Testing
was conducted at their homes.
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STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
The stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2.
Results
Familiar Data
The subjects in the neutral group responded correctly on 96% of the
object and substance trials. The subjects in the syntax group were
correct on 100% of the trials (Figure 10). A 2 X 2 anova (trial type
(object x substance) X group (neutral x syntax)) revealed no main effects
or interaction (all F's < 2.6, p's > .13). The subjects' performance on
both kinds of trials was significantly greater than chance (object: t(23)
= 23.006, p < .0000002, 2-tailed; substance: t(23) = 23.006, p <
.0000002, 2-tailed).
Unfamiliar Data
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Figure 10 -- Difference from Chance on Fomiliar Object Trials and
Familiar Substance Trials for the Neutral and Syntax Groups
L) 40-
z 20-
r. 10 
er o
· 0-0
v- -10
o -20-
w -30-
CD -40
.~An 
Neutral Syntax
Group
- 72 -
Objects
s "1111- 0 Chnce
Substancec
__I
.................... .~?:-~ fU K 1O
i
i
i
The subjects in the neutral group did 93% of the object trials
correctly and 79% of the substance trials correctly. The subjects in the
syntax group did 90% of the object trials correctly and 91% of the
substance trials correctly (Figure 11).
A two-way anova comparing trial type with group revealed no main
effects or interactions (all F's < 2.4, p's > .13). The grand mean was
significantly greater than chance (t(23) = 17.398, p < .0000002,
2-tailed).
A three-way ANOVA including the data from Experiment 2 compared the
above two factors with age (2;1 x 2;7). It revealed trial type and age
main effects (trial type: F (1,44) = 14.833, p < .001; age: F(1,44) =
9.834, p = .003) and a trial type X age interaction (F(1,44) = 4.84, p =
.033) (Figure 12). A Newman-Keuls test showed that the younger subjects
did significantly worse on the substance trials than on the object trials
and than the older subjects did on both kinds of trials. There were no
other significant differences.
An anova comparing the configuration of the named substance showed
that the subjects' performance was not significantly different on the two
kinds of configurations (F(1,22) = .034, p = .854). Other analyses were
done comparing session, stimulus items, stimulus order, coding sheet, and
sex. The only significant effect was with the object items (F(3,69) =
3.466, p = .021). The mean scores for the four object items were:
pyramids: 96%, pancakes: 96%, half eggs: 90%, and kidneys: 81%. All of
these scores are significantly greater than chance (all t's > 6.192, p's
< .000005). All other F's < 1.28, p's > .26.
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Figure 1 1 -- Difference from Chance on Unfamllar Object Trinl and
Unfamiliar Substance Trials for the Neutral and Syntax Groups
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Figure 12 -- Difference from Chence on Unfamiliar Object Tnals and
ULnfamilior Substance Trials for the 2-year-olds and the 2 1/2-year-olds.
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In sum, there was no difference between the object and substance
scores and between the neutral and syntax groups. However, the subjects'
near ceiling performance may have masked any differences. The subjects
chose the object of the original object kind in the object trials and the
substance of the original substance kind in the substance trials. The 2
1/2-year-olds did better than the 2-year-olds and their advantage was due
to an improvement in the substance scores relative to the object scores.
There was a difference in the subjects' performance in the object trials
depending on the stimulus. However, they did choose the object of the
original object kind more often than chance with each kind of object.
Production Data
On average, the subjects used 121 count noun tokens and 31 mass noun
tokens. 83% of the count nouns were singular and 15% were plural. Of
the singular count nouns 45% were used with no determiners, 42% were used
with "a", and 12% were used with "the". 84% of the plural count nouns
were used with no determiners. Of the mass nouns 83% were used with no
determiners and 9% were used with "the". 85% of the mass nouns types
were non-solid substance words. 51% of those were food words. There was
one solid substance word, "wood". It was used by one subject 3 times and
by two other subjects one time each.
A syntax score was found for each of the subjects'. The scores were
computed as in Experiments 1 and 2. They indicate the subjects'
differentiation of count and mass nouns. As with the younger subjects,
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95% of their errors were errors of omission. The mean percent of errors
with mass nouns was 4% and with count nouns was 37%.
The syntax scores ranged from 0 to 159 (mean: 97). The mean for the
neutral group was 100 and the mean for the syntax group was 95. The
performance of the two groups was not significantly different (t(22) =
.245, p = .81, 2-tailed).
Also, a semantic score was computed that indicates the subjects'
differentiation of the object trials from the substance trials. These
scores ranged from 13 to 100 (mean: 77). The correlation coefficient for
these two scores was .387 which is marginally significantly different
from chance (p = .06, 2-tailed).
The effect of selective syntax on the subjects' performance on the
word learning task was reevaluated using only the subjects who scored
higher than the median on the syntax score. The median score was 109.5.
There were 6 subjects in each condition (syntax and neutral). The
neutral group was correct in 96% of the object trials and 87% of the
substance trials. The syntax group was correct in 94% of the object
trials and the substance trials (Figure 13). A 2 X 2 anova comparing
group by condition revealed no significant main effects or interactions
(all F's < .812, p's > .389).
The performance of the 2 1/2-year-olds was compared with the
performance of the 2-year-olds. The 2-year-olds had a mean of 58% on the
syntax score and a mean of 56% on the semantic score. The difference
between the two age groups on both kinds of scores was significantly
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Figure 13 -- Difference from Chance on Unfamiliar Object Tnals and
Unfamiliar Substance Tr1als for the Subjects in the Neutral and Syntax Groups
whose Syntax Scores were Above the Median
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different (syntax score: t(44) = 3.180, p < .005, 2-tailed; semantic
score: t(44) = 3.130, p < .005, 2-tailed).
In sum, the neutral group and the syntax group were equally
proficient with count/mass syntax. On the other hand, the 2
1/2-year-olds as a whole were better than the 2-year-olds. There was a
small correlation between the 2 1/2-year-olds' ability to differentiate
count nouns from mass nouns and their ability to differentiate object
names from non-solid substance names. There was no effect of selective
syntax, even on the subjects who were most proficient at count/mass
syntax; but, the difference was in the right direction.
Discussion
As in the previous experiments, the subjects chose the object of the
original object kind on the object trials and the substance of the
original substance kind on the substance trials. The strength of this
finding is enhanced by its replicability with three different sets of
subjects.
There were two differences between the results of this experiment and
the results of Experiment 2. First, the 2 1/2-year-olds were better on
the substance trials than were the 2-year-olds. By 2 1/2 subjects are no
longer better at determining the meaning of object names compared to
non-solid substance names. Also, the 2-year-olds improved on the
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substance trials across sessions but the 2 1/2-year-olds were as good in
the first session as in the second. It is possible that the reason for
this improvement is that the older subjects have overcome the effects of
the bias to pick single things. It is also possible that they understand
more clearly that shape is irrelevant to the kind of a non-solid
substance.
Second, there was a small correlation between the 2 1/2-year-olds'
command of the count/mass distinction and their command of the
object/non-solid substance distinction. This pattern was not found for
the 2-year-olds. This result cannot be interpreted as support for
Quine's position because the younger subjects who already distinguished
objects from non-solid substances did not show the correlation. However,
it is possible that the subjects begin by representing both distinctions
independently. Then, when they understand the relationship between the
two distinctions, they use their knowledge of syntax to further elaborate
their knowledge of semantics. In fact, it could be that the conceptual
development that accounts for the subjects' improvement on the substance
trials is a result of this sort of process. However, it is also possible
that the reverse is true; that is, that further elaboration of the
subjects' representation of syntax is due to their knowledge of
semantics. For example, Gathercole (1986) has argued that the count/mass
distinction is not complete until children are at least 7-years-old.
Some of this more advanced knowledge may be acquired by the subjects
through an analogy to their knowledge of semantics. The data do not
favor either interpretation and it is equally possible that neither is
correct. Neither follows from Quine's claims about the relationship
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between syntax and semantics.
As in the previous experiments the data also do not support the claim
that children use syntactic information to constrain inferences about the
meaning of particular words. There was no difference between the neutral
and syntax groups even though these subjects were better at count/mass
syntax than the 2-year-olds. In fact, when the 2 1/2-year-olds with the
best command of syntax were evaluated separately, there was still no
difference. However, there was a 12% difference between the two groups
on the non-solid substance trials. The lack of a statistically
significant difference could have been due to a ceiling effect rather
than the knowledge of the subjects. Consequently, it would not be
informative to test even older subjects with this task. One way to test
the effect of syntax would be to use mass syntax in the object trials and
count syntax in the substance trials. If the subjects can use syntactic
information to help constrain word meanings, then their performance on
both kinds of trials should move closer to chance.
The fourth experiment tests the proposed constraint from a different
direction. It uses the spontaneous speech of Adam, Eve, and Sarah and
Allison Bloom (Bloom, 1973; Brown, 1973; MacWhinney and Snow, 1985) as
data. Specifically, the natural development of the lexicon is examined
for effects of the constraint.
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Experiment 4
The results from the first three experiments have supported the
proposed constraint:
When children hear a new word used to refer to a solid
object, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind
of object. When they hear a new word used to refer to a
non-solid substance, their first hypothesis about its meaning
is the kind of substance.
The experiments varied the stimuli used and the ages of the subjects.
Experiment 4 tests the constraint through an examination of spontaneous
speech.
The goal of Experiment 4 is to test a different prediction based on
the constraint. All constraints have positive and negative effects on
induction. The constraints enable certain inferences to be made while
inhibiting others. The first three experiments have documented the
positive effects of the proposed constraint: namely, that children are
facilitated in learning object words (chair, book) and non-solid
substance words ("water", "mud"). A negative effect of the proposed
constraint is that children should have difficulty learning solid
substance words ("wood", "metal"). Solid substances are always in the
form of solid objects. According to the proposed constraint, children
think that words said of solid objects have the object kind as their
meaning and not the substance kind. Therefore, children should not be
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able to make the inference that a word has as a meaning solid substance
kind. Experiment 4 examines this prediction by comparing children's use
of solid substance words with their use of non-solid substance words.
The effect of word frequency in the children's mothers' speech and in
adult-adult speech is also examined.
Method
SUBJECTS
The corpora from Adam, Eve, and Sarah from Roger Brown (Brown, 1973)
and Allison from Lois Bloom (Bloom, 1973) were examined. The corpora
were accessed through the Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES)
(MacWhinney & Snow, 1985). Adam and Sarah were followed from 2;3 to 5;2.
Eve and Allison were begun at 1;6. Eve was recorded until 2;5 and Allison
was recorded until 2;2.
PROCEDURE
The children's speech and the mothers' speech were examined
exhaustively for use of solid substance words and non-solid substance
words. The solid substance words probed were: "metal", "brass", "steel",
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"tin", "plastic", "glass", "wood", "stone", and "rubber". The non-solid
substance words probed were: "sand", "Play-doh", "water", "powder",
"dirt", "mud", "paint", "glue", "paste", "snow", "toothpaste", "shampoo",
"clay", "milk", "juice", "peanut-butter", "butter", "ketchup", "jelly",
"ice-cream", and "soup". The speech samples were blocked into 3 month
periods.
Each word's frequency of usage in adult language was determined
(Francis and Kucera, 1982). The effect of adult frequency on the
subjects' usage was examined in the following way. If the average
frequency of the non-solid substance words used by a subject was much
greater than the average frequency of solid substance words used by that
subject, then the non-solid substance words outside of the frequency
range of the solid substance words were excluded. For example, if the
set of non-solid substance words that Adam used had a higher average
frequency in adult usage than the set of solid substance words that he
used, then some of his non-solid substance words were excluded. The
resulting subset of non-solid substance words closely approximated the
solid substance words he used in the average frequency per type and token
and in the range of frequency. Then his relative usage of each kind of
word was reevaluated using the subset of the word type with the more
frequent adult usage. Any effects discovered through these analyses
could not be due to adult frequency.
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Results
Adam
Figure 14 shows the number of tokens Adam used. In the period of
recording Adam used solid substance words 50 times and non-solid
substance words 640 times. He used non-solid substance words 112 times
in the first 3 months of recording (note: recall that each point on the
graph is one 3 month period). In contrast, he used solid substance words
15 times in the first 15 months of testing. At the beginning of the
recordings he was already using non-solid substance words freely. At the
same time he was not using any solid substance words. His "burst" of
solid substance words came between 3;3 and 3;5 at which time he used them
11 times. When the sessions began (and Adam was using non-solid
substance words) Adam was at stage 1 speech with an MLU of 1.75. At 3;3
(when he began using solid substance words) he was at stage 4 speech with
an MLU of 3.7 (Brown, 1973).
An examination of the number of types Adam used reveals the same
pattern (Figure 14). He used a total of 7 solid substance words and 20
non-solid substance words in the recording period. In the first 3 months
he used 11 non-solid substance words and 0 solid substance words. He
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Figure 14a -- Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Adam from 2;3 - 5;2
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Figure 14b -- Nuber of Types of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Adam from 2;3 - 5;2
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used 5 solid substance words between 3;6 and 3;8. At that time he was
bordering stage 5 with an MLU of 4.0 (Brown, 1973).
When Adam did begin to use solid substance words, he seemed to use
them appropriately and as nouns, not modifiers. His first use was "Dat
rubber". In this case, it is not clear what he was referring to,
however, he did use "rubber" as a noun. By 3;3 to 3;5 he used "wood" 11
times in phrases such as "piece of wood" and "some wood" referring to the
wood on a hammer and a piece of wood mixed with his toys. In the next
three month period he continued to use "wood" in the same context and
also used "rubber" in the phrase "made of rubber" and "plastic" in the
phrase f"why plastic come off?". In all cases the word was used as a
noun and in the context of building things. These uses provide the
clearest evidence that he is using the words to refer to the solid
substances. At this time, he also could use solid substance words as
modifiers. He used "stone" in 5 noun phrases as a modifier to the noun.
For example, he said "a stone bug". For the rest of the recorded period,
he continued to use solid substance words in the context of building or
when discussing what different things were made of. He used the words
both as nouns and modifiers, but mostly as nouns (overall: 33 times as a
noun, 13 times as a modifier, and 4 times ambiguously).
His non-solid substance words were both food words and non-food
words, but mostly food words. In the first three months he used 44 food
words, 31 non-food words, and "water" 37 times (water is both). Overall
he used 235 food words, 178 non-food words, and "water" 227 times.
Adam's solid substance words had adult frequencies between 12 and
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110. The average frequency per token was 52 and per type was 51. A subset
of his non-solid substance words had a frequency range of 12 to 103. The
average frequency per token was 40 and per type was 42. The subset was
formed by including all the non-solid substance words in the specified
frequency range.
The difference between Adam's use of solid substance words and his
use of the subset of non-solid substance words is less extreme than the
differences found in previous comparisons. Yet, the same pattern is
still present (Figure 15). His total use of the subset of non-solid
substance words is reduced to 339 tokens and 11 types. In the first 3
months he used 65 tokens and 7 types. Recall that his use of solid
substance words overall was 50 tokens and 7 types. He used none in the
first 3 months.
Adam's mother also used solid substance words less frequently than
non-solid substance words. In fact, her use of each kind of word
directly parallels Adam's use (Figure 16). She used 5 solid substance
words 35 times and 19 non-solid substance words 334 times in the
recording period. In the first 3 months she used 1 solid substance word
2 times and 10 non-solid substance words 65 times. Adam's peaks in usage
occurred at the same time as his mother's peaks.
Sarah
Sarah's results are very much like Adam's (Figure 17). She used
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Figure 15a -- Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words in the
Restricted Set and All Solid Substnce Words used by Adarn from 2;3 - 5;2
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Figure 16e -- Nurer of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Soid
Substance Words used by Adam's Mother when Adam was 2;3 - 5;2
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Figure 16b - Number of Types of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Adam's Mother when Adam was 2;3 - 5;2
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non-solid substance words 403 times and solid substance words 15 times in
the recording period. She used non-solid substance words frequently in
the first 3 months (49 times). At that time her MLU was around 1.9 and
she was at stage 1 (Brown, 1973). Her "burst" (6 tokens) of solid
substance words occurred between 4;3 and 4;5 at which time her MLU was
greater than 4.0 and she was at stage 5 (Brown, 1973).
The pattern of Sarah's use of types is very similar (Figure 17).
Overall she used 17 non-solid substance words and 3 solid substance
words. In the first 3 months she used 5 non-solid substance words and no
solid substance words. She never used more than 2 different solid
substance words in a 3 month period.
Sarah's uses of solid substance words are more ambiguous than
Adam's. In her earliest productions it is not clear if she was using the
words as object words or solid substance words. For example, she said "a
glass" but was referring to glass on a stove. In this case "glass" is a
noun; but her use of count noun syntax suggests that maybe she meant
"glass" as an object even though the referent was not a drinking glass.
At 4;6 her use of "glass" was more clear. She said "want me to have it
with some glass over it?" while drawing a picture of a car with glass on
it. At this time, she seems to be using "glass" appropriately and again
as a noun. However, she never used any solid substance words with the
phrase "made of" or as a building supply. She also used other solid
substance words ("wood" and "plastic"), but all of her uses were as
nouns.
Her non-solid substance words were mostly food words and "water". In
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the first 3 months she used "powder" once and food words 48 times.
Overall she used non-food words 103 times, food words 199 times, and
"water" 101 times.
The adult frequency range of Sarah's solid substance words was 33 to
110. The average frequency per type was 71 and per token was 68. A subset
of her non-solid substance words had an adult frequency range of 35 to
59. The average frequency per type was 45 and per token was 49. Figure 18
shows that she used tokens of the subset of non-solid substance words
more frequently than tokens of solid substance words. She used the
non-solid substance words 141 times and solid substance words 15 times
overall. In contrast, her use of non-solid substance word types for the
subset of non-solid substance words is only slightly greater than her use
of solid substance word types (Figure 18). She used 5 different non-solid
substance words and 3 different solid substance words. However, in each
3 month period her use of different non-solid substance words was greater
than her use of different solid substance words.
Sarah's mother's use of the non-solid substance and solid substance
words was similar to Sarah's (Figure 19). She used -18 non-solid substance
words 463 times and 5 solid substance words 10 times in the recorded
period. She used 10 non-solid substance words 70 times in the first 3
months. She used no solid substance in the first 3 months. She never
used solid substance words more than 3 times in a 3 month period. The
peaks and valleys in her usage of both kinds of words match the peaks and
valleys in Sarah's usage.
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Figure 1 B - Nmber of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words in the
Restricted Set and All Solid Substance Words used by Sarah from 2;3 - 5;2
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Figure 19a - Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
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Eve
Eve used 12 non-solid substance words 358 times and 1 solid substance
word ("rubber") 3 times overall (Figure 20). In the first 3 months she
used 9 non-solid substance words 106 times and no solid substance words.
She never had a burst of solid substance words. In the first session she
was 1;6, had an MLU of 1.5, and was not yet at stage 1. At the end of her
recordings she was 2;5, had an MLU of 4.2, and was at stage 5 (Brown,
1973).
Two of the three times Eve used "rubber" were in the phrase "rubber
pant". She seemed to be using the word correctly and as a modifier.
However, it is not completely clear what it meant for her. The whole
phrase might have referred to a kind of pant and not the material. The
third time she used "rubber" was in the sentence "That a rubber". She
was referring to the eraser at the end of a pencil. She was using the
word as a noun, but it is very possible that she had the meaning of
"eraser" encoded by the word "rubber".
She used non-solid substance words for foods and non-foods, but
mostly for foods. In the first three months she used 86 food terms, 6
non-food terms, and "water" 14 times. Overall she used food terms 296
times, non-food terms 36 times, and "water" 26 times.
Her solid substance word had an adult frequency of 16. One of her
non-solid substance words ("soup") also had an adult frequency of 16
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Figure 20a - Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Eve from 1;6 - 2;5
IN
IN
0I
N
N
P)N
NY
Age (years; months)
Figure 20b - Number of Types of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Eve from, 1,6 - 2;5
!
N
N
i
I?
'4
Age (years; months)
- 96 -
200-
180-
160-
140 -
120 -
100 -
80-
60 -
40 -
#A
cC
0G,
.
"-
E
:9
Non-Solid
Solid
20
0
6'0
a
I-
o
i,.!1
9o
8 -
7-
6 -
5-
4-
3-
2-
1 -
0-
Non-Solid
Solid
ca
.m,
ICPV_

Fl , · R--CfS--J
-·II--· --- - -- -------- --
rOD
qI*
i
4ll
! J
-
.
0
(Figure 21). She used "soup" earlier and more frequently than "rubber".
She used "soup" 53 times and 23 times in the first 3 months. She used
"rubber" 3 times and not until the second 3 months.
Eve's mother used 13 non-solid substance words 337 times and 1 solid
substance word 1 time (Figure 22). She used 8 non-solid substance words
115 times in the first 3 months and no solid substance words. Her
pattern of usage can be superimposed with Eve's.
Allison
Allison did not use any solid substance words (Figure 23). She used 4
non-solid substance words 47 times overall and 1 of them 5 times in the
first 3 months. Since Allison did not use any solid substance words, it
is impossible to pick a nonempty subset of non-solid substance words in a
comparable range. At the beginning of her recordings she was not yet at
stage 1.
The words Allison used were: "juice" (42 times), "ice-cream" (3
times), "water" (1 time), and "snow" (1 time).
Allison mother also did not use any solid substance words (Figure
24). She used 5 non-solid substance words 82 times. Her use of non-solid
substance words is different from Allison. Allison began with 6 tokens
and increased steadily to 26 (across 3 3-month periods). Allison mother
used 23 tokens in the first 3-month period, increased to 34, and fell
back down to 25.
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Figure 21 - Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words in the
Restricted Set and All Solid Substance Words used by Eve from 1,5 - 2;5
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Figure 22a -- Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Eve's Mother when Eve was 16 - 2,5
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Figure 22b -- Number of Types of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Eve's Mother when Eve was 1;6 - 2;5
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Figure 23a -- Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Allison from 16 - 2;2
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Figure 24a -- Number of Tokens of Non-Solid Substance Words and Solid
Substance Words used by Allison's Mother when Allison was 1;6 - 2;2
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Discussion
Each of the children used non-solid substance words earlier and more
frequently than solid substance words. From these data I conclude that
children learn solid substance words later than non-solid substance
words. This conclusion may be flawed, however, because it could be that
children did not have the opportunity to use solid substance words in the
recording sessions, but did use them in other situations. However, there
is empirical evidence against that possibility. David Dickinson (1986)
examined children's comprehension of solid substance words. He found
that only 64% of the 3 1/2-year-olds comprehended "glass" and only 46%
comprehended "wood". 36% of the subjects did not know any solid
substance words at all. Similarly, in the first three experiments none
of the 2-year-olds used any solid substance words and only 3 of the 2
1/2-year-olds used one. In contrast, all the subjects used many
non-solid substance words.
Given that solid substance words are learned later than non-solid
substance words, the cause of the phenomenon must be evaluated. Is it
due to the proposed constraint or another factor? Two possible factors
are adult-adult frequency and adult-child frequency.
The effect of adult-adult frequency was examined in the following
way. Analyses of the productions of Adam, Eve, and Sarah were conducted
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in which the higher frequency of non-solid substance words was taken into
account. The non-solid substance words with extreme frequencies were
excluded. For each child the remaining non-solid substance words were in
the same frequency range as the child's solid substance words.
The results demonstrate that adult-adult frequency may have some role
in determining the words children acquire but is not the only factor.
When frequency was equated all results were less striking. However,
adult-adult frequency can not account for all of the results. Even with
the frequencies equated, there was still a difference between the
children's use of non-solid substance words and solid substance words.
Each child used the subset of non-solid substance words earlier and more
frequently than solid substance words.
However, the role of frequency may be more important than suggested
by this argument. It could be that when adults are talking to children
they use solid substance words even less frequently (relative to
non-solid substance words) than when they are talking to other adults.
In that case the pattern of children's productions could be reflections
of adult usage to children. This, in fact, seems to be the case. The
adult patterns seem to be identical to the children's patterns in the
speech samples.
An important question is: What is the direction of causation? Does
the lack of solid substance words in adult speech account for children's
difficulty with solid substance words (lack of exposure) or is the
reverse true (maternal sensitivity)? If a lack of exposure is the reason
for children's nonuse of solid substance words, then they ought to use
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them, given appropriate exposure.
This possibility has been tested, but it is not clear what kind of
exposure would be appropriate. Dickinson (in press) tried to teach
children solid substance words. He used the procedure from Experiments 1
through 3 with 2 minor changes. First, his objects were shaped like
chunks of material, rather than real objects. Second, the introduction
of the word was, "This is made of blicket". 4 and 5-year-olds did think
that the word referred to the material, but 3-year-olds did not. S.
Waxman (personal communication, June 24, 1987) has argued that the
children may need to hear the words used as modifiers, not nouns. This
experiment has not been done. However, in these recordings solid
substance words are learned as nouns before they are learned as
modifiers. Adam and Sarah, the only children who knew more than one
solid substance word, learned them first as nouns. In fact, Sarah, by
5-years-old had still not used any as modifiers. Adam did use solid
substance words as modifiers, but not as frequently as he used them as
nouns. Another possibility (S. Waxman, personal communication, June 24,
1987) is that children would only learn solid substance words in
situations in which the substance is relevant. This hypothesis has also
not been tested experimentally; however, it is worth noting that there
are some natural experiences in which solid substances are relevant. For
example, when children are banging objects to create noise and when they
break objects, the material is essential. In those situations you might
expect the mothers to use the words and the children to learn them given
this hypothesis. However, children do not learn solid substance words
until they are 3 or 4-years-old.
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If children's difficulty with solid substance words is due to a lack
of ability, then the adults' nonuse of solid substance words could be due
to their sensitivity to their children's competencies. There is evidence
that mothers, when referring to objects, use different words with
children than with adults in order to avoid using words the children
would not understand (Anglin, 1977, Mervis & Mervis, 1982). Similarly,
the mothers' suppression of solid substance words may have been caused by
their recognition that their children would not comprehend solid
substance words.
In conclusion, as predicted by the proposed constraint, young
children are delayed in learning solid substance words. However, the
reason for the delay is not necessarily the constraint. The delay could
be due to a lack of exposure to the words.
If the delay is due to the constraint, then another question is: to
what degree does the constraint inhibit projection over solid
substances? It could be that the constraint is effective because it
specifies which concepts can be named. If so, then young children should
be able to make nonlinguistic inferences over solid substances. On the
other hand, the constraint could be effective because it specifies which
concepts can support any inductive inference. If this is the case, then
young children should not be able to make any inferences over solid
substances. This issue is addressed in Experiment 5.
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EXPERIMENT 5
The purpose of the first four experiments was to support the proposed
constraint. The fifth and sixth experiments accept the constraint as
psychologically real and address additional questions. The fifth
experiment attempts to answer the question: is the constraint used only
to constrain inferences about word meaning or is it used to constrain any
cognitive inference? It could be that it applies to the induction of any
property, not just the induction of word meanings. For example, it could
be that the constraint should be stated more broadly:
When children are making any inductive projection from a
solid object, their projection is based on the object's
kind. When they are making any inductive projection from a
non-solid substance, their projection is based on the
substance's kind.
This formulation implies that children have a single similarity space
underlying all inductive projection over physical entities. It is
organized around kinds of objects and kinds of non-solid substances.
That is, objects are seen as similar if they are the same kind of object
and non-solid substances are seen as similar if they are the same kind of
substance.
Experiment 5 tests this cognitive constraint. The subjects were
asked to make projections about the heaviness of objects. The relative
weight of an object is determined by the material that the object is made
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out of and its size, but not the kind of the object. This experiment
asks whether young children realize the role of material or are fixated
on object kind. They were also given a naming task with the same objects
in order to see if they could vary the basis of their projections over
the same set of objects.
Pilot testing revealed that 2 1/2-year-olds could not succeed on the
naming task. Consequently, this experiment was run on 3-year-olds. The
task is slightly different from the naming task of Experiments 1 - 3 and
those differences could account for the difference in results. This
possibility is examined in the discussion and in the next experiment.
Method
There were two tasks: a weight task and a naming task. The order of
the tasks was counterbalanced across subjects. There was also a
pretraining of the word "heavy" which directly preceded the weight task.
The orders were: naming, pretraining, weight; or pretraining, weight,
naming.
SUBJECTS
There were 8 subjects. The mean age was 3;3 (range: 3;0 - 3;5). They
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were tested individually at their day care centers in an empty room.
STIMULI
In the pretraining for the weight task a pair of objects were used in
each trial. The objects of a pair were the same size, but had different
shapes, different materials, and different weights. In the two main
tasks quadruples of objects were used. Each quadruple had two shapes and
two materials, such that each shape was paired with each material. Also
the two materials were very different in weight. Some of the objects
were weighted to satisfy this criterion. The size of the four objects
within a quadruple was the same. There were eight trials in each task.
No shape or material was used in more than one set of stimuli, resulting
in 16 shapes and 16 materials. See Appendix 4 for pictures of the
objects and a list of the materials. The same eight sets were used in
the weight task and the naming task.
PROCEDURE
Pretraining for the Weight Task
The subjects were first introduced to Pokey, a horse, and told that
Pokey likes heavy things. They were given the two objects of one pair
and asked which was the heavy object. They were then reminded that Pokey
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likes heavy things and were asked to give the heavy object to Pokey. If
the subjects chose the incorrect object, they were corrected. The
experimenter felt the objects and said, "Hmmm ... I'm not sure, why
don't you think about it again." He then returned the objects to the
subject for another judgment. When the subjects chose the correct object
in their first judgment for four trials in a row, the weight task began.
Weight Task
The subjects were given two objects of one set, (O1,Ml) and (02,M2)
(read as OBJECT 1, MATERIAL 1 and OBJECT 2, MATERIAL 2), and were asked
to give Pokey the heavy toy. If the subjects picked the wrong object,
the experimenter said, "Hmmm ... I'm not sure, why don't you think about
it again." The other toy was put to the side, still in the subjects'
view. The subjects were then shown (O1,M2) and (02,M1) (but could not
touch them) and were asked to predict which object was heavier. There
were eight weight trials.
Naming Task
The subjects were introduced to Gumby, a man, and were told that
Gumby likes some of the toys that they would be playing with. Again, the
subjects were given two objects, (O1,M1) and (02,M2). One of the objects
was put to the side, still in the subjects' view. The other object was
named and described as a favorite of Gumby's. For example, the
experimenter said, "This is my mindert. Gumby really likes the mindert.
Can you give the mindert to Gumby." As in the weight task, the other two
objects, (O1,M2) and (02,M1), were presented (visually, only) and the
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subjects were asked, "Which is the mindert?" There were eight naming
trials.
It was predicted that the constraint the subjects use in naming is
not a general purpose cognitive constraint, but a constraint on naming.
Therefore, the subjects should be able to make projections over material
kind when appropriate. Accordingly, in the weight task responses that
were based on material kind were considered correct and in the naming
task responses based on object kind were considered correct.
Results
Weight Pretraining
6 of the subjects made no errors on the weight judgments in the
pretraining. 2 of the subjects made one error.
Weight and Naming Tasks
The mean score on the weight task was 66% and the mean score on the
naming task was 67%. The performance on both tasks was significantly
greater than chance, but the difference on the naming task is only of
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one-tailed significance (weight: t(7) = 2.828, p = .028, 2-tailed;
naming: t(7) = 2.091, p = .04, 1-tailed). In order to see whether there
was a difference between the subjects' approach to the two tasks, the
scores from the two tasks needed to be calculated in the same way.
Therefore the percent of trials in which the subject chose according to
shape was found for both tasks. This score is the same as the percent
correct for the naming task but equals 100 minus the percent correct for
the weight task (Figure 25). An anova run on these scores demonstrates
that the subjects' performance on the weight task was significantly
different from their performance on the naming task (F(1,7) = 10.113, p =
.015).
A 2 X 2 anova using the original naming and weight scores was run to
examine the interaction between the order of the tasks and the kind of
the task. There were no significant effects (order: F(1,6) = .189, p =
.679; tasks: F(1,6) = .021, p = .889; interaction: F(1,6) = .021, p =
.889).
Other anovas comparing the items and the order of the items within a
condition revealed no significant effects (all F's < 1.825, p's > .104).
Discussion
The subjects were able to base inductive projection on different
properties depending on the nature of the projection. When asked to make
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Figure 25 -- Difference from Chance in the Weight Task and the NMming Task
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predictions about the relative weights of objects, they based their
inferences on the materials of the objects and not their shapes. In
contrast, when asked to predict which of two objects had the same name as
another object, they based their inferences on the shape of the objects
or the object kinds.
Therefore, the proposed constraint can not be stated as a general
cognitive constraint. It does not govern all inductive inference.
Children must have at least 2 similarity spaces underlying inductive
projection. In one the similarity of two objects is determined by the
relationship between the kinds of the objects. In the other the
similarity of two objects is determined by the relationship between the
material kinds of the objects.
One question that arises from this data is why are the 3-year-olds so
much worse on this naming task than the naming task in Experiments 1 -
3? In those experiments the subjects were only introduced to 1 object
initially. In this experiment they were introduced to 2 objects, but one
was ignored and one was named. Another, probably more important
difference, is that in the original naming task the same-material
alternative was 3 or 4 small pieces of an object. In this experiment the
same-material alternative was another whole object. The subjects may
well have known that pieces of an object were not be the same kind of
thing as a whole object. If so, then the original naming task would have
been very easy. In Experiment 5 the subjects could not have used that
kind of information to decide which objects were the same kind. The
subjects may not be very good at determining object kind under these
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conditions. In Experiment 6 this issue is further investigated.
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EXPERIMENT 6
To repeat, the proposed constraint is:
When children hear a new word used to refer to a solid
object, their first hypothesis about its meaning is the kind
of object. When they hear a new word used to refer to a
non-solid substance, their first hypothesis about its meaning
is the kind of substance.
This constraint addresses the mapping problem. Given any particular
object, it presumes that children already know the kind of the object as
well as other properties of the object. The role of the constraint,
then, is to specify which property is mapped onto a word used to name
that object. Similarly, given any non-solid substance the constraint
specifies which property of the substance is mapped onto a word used to
name the substance. It does not address how children develop a
representation of the various properties of the substance. Another
question is: how do children determine what an object's kind or a
non-solid substance's kind is?
Two pilot studies have addressed this question with respect to
objects. In the first, 2 1/2-year-olds were given the naming task of
Experiment 5. An object was named for them and they were asked which of
two other objects had that name. One object had the same shape as the
named object, the other object had the same material as the named
object. The subjects were at chance. Even the 3-year-olds that were
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tested in Experiment 5, although better than chance, were only at 67%
correct. It is clear from Experiments - 3 that 2 1/2-year-olds know
that the meaning of a word used to refer to a solid object is the
object's kind. Therefore the subjects' inability to choose either object
consistently suggests that they were confused about the defining
properties of the object kind. In other words, they knew that the
meaning of the word was the object's kind, but did not know whether the
object kind was defined by shape, material, or some other property.
This conclusion seems contradictory to the results of Experiments 1 -
3. However, there is an important difference in the naming tasks between
those experiments and this pilot. In the original procedure, the
same-material choice was in 3 or 4 pieces. The subjects may have
rejected that stimulus because they knew that an object was not the same
kind of thing as a collection of pieces, regardless of any similarity.
Given this knowledge, the subjects did not need to know that shape was
more important than material in determining object kind to succeed on the
task. In the pilot, as in experiment 5, both test stimuli were single
objects. Either object could have been the same kind of object as the
original depending on how "kind of object" was defined.
It may seem that the spontaneous speech data suggest that young
children do not think that words refer to solid substances. But, it
could be that the subjects thought that the word (in the pilot) referred
to an object made out of a certain substance. For example, they would
not have inferred that the word meant "metal", but they may have inferred
that the word meant "metal object". The word would have still referred
- 116 -
to the object kind, but the object kind would have been specified by a
material. In fact, there are words in the adult lexicon with this
property. For example, the word "rug" has as a meaning a kind of object,
not a kind of substance. Yet, not any floor covering can be a rug. A
piece of plastic that covers part of a floor is not a rug because it is
made out of the wrong kind of material. A piece of woven material of the
same size, color, shape and used in the same way would be considered a
rug because of its material.
That pilot study suggests that 2 1/2-year-olds are not sure which
features are most relevant to object kind: shape or material. A
different pilot study indicates that under certain circumstances children
are sure which features define object kind. The second study had the
same procedure as the first. The difference was in the stimuli. The
object with the original material was irregularly shaped and small, like
a chunk of an object. The subjects recognized that differences in either
regularity or size specified differences in kind of object. It is not
the case that size indicates object kind. A tremendous chair and a tiny
chair are both the same kind of object. However, regularity is relevant
to object kind. Something that is regular is often a purposefully
designed artifact. Something that is irregular is often an arbitrary
piece of a substance. Usually an arbitrary piece of material and an
artifact are not the same kind of object. Consequently, we hypothesized
that young children use regularity, but not size, to specify kind of
object.
In this experiment we attempted to replicate the two pilot studies
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and also determine whether young children can use regularity
(independently of size) as an indicator of object type.
Method
SUBJECTS
There were 12 boys and 12 girls ranging in age from 2;5 to 2;8 (mean
age: 2;6). They were tested individually at their homes. The parents of
each subject were paid $3.00 for their participation.
PROCEDURE
The S was given one object and its name. For example, the E said,
"This is my tulver". The S and the E then played with the object and the
E continued to name it using "my" and "the" for determiners. Then that
object was put to the side, still in the S's view, and two new objects
were presented. The E said, "Can you find the tulver here?"
There were three different conditions and four trials within each
condition. Each S received all three conditions. The trials were
blocked by condition. The order of the conditions was counterbalanced
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across subjects.
One object was named for the subject. Then two other objects were
presented. One had the original shape and one had the original
material. The size and style of the material choice varied across
conditions
STIMULI
Each trial involved four objects. The objects had two shapes (S1,
S2) and two materials (M1, M2) crossed with each other. Therefore, the
four objects were (S1,M1); (S2,M2); (Sl,M2); and (S2,M1). In each trial
3 of the 4 objects were used. The objects that were used were
counterbalanced across subjects; but the particular form of
counterbalancing depended on the condition. Twenty-four different shapes
and twenty-four different materials were used. Therefore, in each trial
two new shapes and two new materials were presented. The shapes and
materials are pictured and described in Appendix 5.
Double Object Condition
Both shapes of a set were regular; that is, they both seemed like
artifacts. They were also both the same size as the named object (Figure
26). Each object served as the named object, the shape choice, the
material choice, and the unused object across subjects.
Little Piece Condition
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Figure 26--Examples of stimuli in the little piece condition,
the big piece condition, and the double object condition
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In each trial one of the shapes was an artifact-type shape. The
other shape was a chunk-type shape. The two chunk-type objects were
smaller than the two artifact-type objects (Figure 26). Each of the
objects with artifact-type shapes were used as the named object across
subjects. For a particular subject the artifact-type object that was not
named and the chunk-type object of the original material were used as the
test objects. The chunk-type object that had a different material than
the named object was not used for that subject.
Big Piece Condition
This condition was identical to the little piece condition except
that the two objects with the chunk-type shape were the same size as the
other two objects (Figure 26).
The subjects' choices were coded as correct if they respected shape
and ignored material since shape is more relevant to object kind, at
least in the case of artifacts. It was predicted that the subjects would
do well in the big piece and the little piece conditions in which the
incorrect object was shaped as a chunk. It was also predicted that they
would do poorly in the double object condition in which the incorrect
object was shaped as an artifact.
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Results
The subjects' performance was 89% correct in the little piece
condition, 81% correct in the big piece condition, and 73% correct in the
double object condition (Figure 27). Chance is 50%. The subjects'
performance in each condition was significantly greater than chance
(little piece: t(23) = 12.25, p < .0000002, 2-tailed; big piece: t(23) =
6.08, p < .000005, 2-tailed; double object: t(23) = 4.70, p < .001,
2-tailed).
A one-way anova comparing the conditions revealed a significant main
effect (F(2,46) = 4.488, p < .017). This indicates that the performance
on the little piece condition was significantly different from the
performance on the double object condition. Subsequent t-tests indicated
that the performance on the big piece condition was not significantly
different from the performance on the little piece condition (t(23) =
1.44, p > .1, 2-tailed) or the performance on the double object condition
(t(23) = 1.4, p > .1, 2-tailed).
A 6 X 2 anova was conducted comparing the order of the conditions by
the conditions. The only significant effect was the condition main
effect, as previously revealed. The order and interaction effects were
not significant (order: F(5,18) = .511, p = .765; interaction: F(10,36) =
1.446, p = .2).
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Figure 27 -- Difference from Chance in the Little Piece, Big Piece
and Double Object Conditions
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One way anovas were run on each condition to examine item effects.
The only significant effect was found for the items in the big piece
condition (big piece: F(3,69) = 6.749, p < .0009; little piece: F(3,69) =
.451, p = .717; double object: F(3,69) = .657, p = .581). The means for
each item, A, B, C, and D, in the big piece condition were 58%, 79%, 92%,
and 96%, respectively. A Newman-Keuls test reveals that the main effect
was due to a significant difference between the performance on item A and
the performance on the other items. There were no other significant
differences between the items.
We tested the hypothesis that the subjects did worst on item A
because the shapes used were more alike than the shapes of the other
items. The materials of item A were aluminum foil (that was pressed into
solid shapes) and rubber (that was carved from erasers). The shapes may
have been more alike than in the other items because they were confined
to the overall dimensions of a large eraser. No similar restrictions
were placed on the shapes of the other items. Adults were shown pairs of
objects from each item in the big piece condition and were asked to rate
their similarity. The scale used was from 1 (very, very similar) to 5
(not similar at all). The adult subjects made comparisons about the
similarity of shape ((S1,M1) and (S2,M1) or (S1,M2) and (S2,M2)); the
similarity of material ((S1,ML) and (S1,M2) or (S2,M1) and (S2,M2)); and
overall similarity ((Sl,Ml) and (S2,M2) or (S1,M2) and (S2,M1)). Note
that there are two pairs of objects that can be compared for each type of
similarity. Each subject made both comparisons. The two scores were
then averaged for each subject. Twenty-four subjects rated both pairs
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for all three types of similarity for all 4 items, resulting in 24
comparisons each.
The mean scores for items A, B, C, and D on the shape comparisons
were 3.0, 3.08, 3.17, and 3.77, respectively. A planned contrast testing
the prediction that the shapes of item A were more alike than the shapes
11
of the other items was significant (F(1,69) = 11.28, p < .002). The
mean scores for the items on the overall comparisons were 4.44, 4.79,
4.60, and 4.9. A planned contrast testing the prediction that the objects
of item A were more similar overall than the objects of the other items
was also significant (F(1,69) = 10.223, p < .005). The mean ratings for
the material comparisons were 2.17, 2.08, 2,13, and 1.79. The same
contrast with respect to material was not significant (F(1,69) = 1.607, p
> .2).12
Because the shapes of item A were significantly more similar than the
shapes of the other items and because the (child) subjects did
significantly worse on that item than the others, the analysis of the
differences between the conditions was redone without item A. The mean
for the big piece condition was 89% (Figure 28). The main effect for
11. It is clear from looking at the means that item D is more different
from the other items than is item A. However, we were not concerned with
the differences in similarity among items B, C, and D. Rather we were
testing the prediction that the shapes of item A were more similar than
any others.
12. Note, that in this case item A has the highest score. The contrast,
however, drops the sign of the weights in the calculation of the mean
square and therefore really tests the prediction that the material (or
shape or overall similarity) of item A was more extreme (either similar
or different) than the materials (or shapes or overall similarity) of the
other items.
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Figure 28 -- Difference from Chance in the Little Piece, Big Piece and
Double Object Conditions, without Item A in the Big Piece Condition
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condition still significant (F(2,46) = 5.193, p = .009). A preplanned
contrast was done to test the prediction that the subjects would do
equally well on the little piece condition and the big piece condition;
but worse on the double object condition. The contrast was significant
(F(2,46) = 10.015, p < .005).
Other anovas showed that there were no effects of sex, the particular
object named, and the order of the objects within a condition (all F's <
1.572, all p's > .226).
In sum, the subjects responded as if shape was more relevant to the
meaning of an object word than material in all three conditions.
However, certain other properties also affected their inferences. They
were more certain of their categorizations when the alternative object
was a chunk rather than another artifact. On the other hand, differences
in size did not affect their decisions.
Discussion
These results are not completely as predicted. When faced with a new
object, 2 1/2-year-olds could determine whether another object of the
same shape or another object of the same material was the same kind of
object. They must have recognized that shape is more relevant to object
kind than material, even in the two artifact condition. This result is
contrary to the pilot result with 2 1/2-year-olds using the materials
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from Experiment 5.
The results also suggest that the subjects recognized a different
aspect of object kind. They recognized that an object --as in an
artifact, not just any solid thing-- and a chunk of material would not be
the same kind of thing. This is clear because they did best in the
conditions in which the incorrect object was chunk-like rather than
artifact-like.
It could be argued that this result is due to a strategy of selecting
the object that had the least number of differing properties with the
named object, ignoring the kinds of the properties. In this experiment,
the correct choice always differed from the named object by one property,
material. Therefore, according to this reasoning, any differences
between the tasks must have been due to the relationship between the
incorrect object and the named object. The greater the difference
between the incorrect object and the named object, the easier the task
should have been. In the double object condition the wrong answer
differed in shape from the named object; but in the pieces conditions the
two objects differed in shape and in "artifact-ness". The children may
have been better at the pieces conditions merely because the wrong
answers had fewer properties in common with the named object than in the
double object condition.
However, there are two reasons why this argument fails. First, in
the little piece condition the two objects also differed in terms of
size, but the subjects did not do better in this condition than in the
big piece condition. Second, the subjects were better than chance in the
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double object condition even though the two choices each differed from
the named object by one property (either shape or material). The
subjects could not have been simply counting the number of differing
properties in a theoretical vacuum. They must have been relying on a
theory of object kind that considers shape and artifact-ness to be
relevant to the definition of a kind of object.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
These experiments addressed three questions:
1. Do children use the proposed constraint as part of their solution
to the mapping problem?
2. Is the proposed constraint a constraint on word meanings or a
cognitive constraint used in all inferences over physical
entities?
3. How is "kind of object" defined for children?
I will discuss the data from the experiments as they pertain to each
of these questions.
Question 1: Do children use the proposed constraint
as part of their solution to the mapping problem?
The constraint has many parts. The first part is that children base
their inferences about word meaning on the ontological kind of the
referent, at least for the kinds solid object and non-solid substance
(examples of non-solid substances are mud and sand). In the first three
experiments the subjects' response patterns consistently supported this
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aspect of the constraint. The basis of their inferences varied depending
on the ontological kind of the referent. They based their inferences on
the shape, size, and number of the referent when it was solid, ignoring
substance and color. In contrast, they based their inferences on the
substance and color of the referent when it was non-solid, ignoring
shape, size, and number. The replicability of these data across
Experiments 1 and 2 are especially significant because the salient
perceptual features of the stimuli differed. The complexity of the
shapes as a function of stimulus type (object or non-solid substance) was
manipulated. In Experiment 1 the objects had more complex shapes, and in
Experiment 2 the non-solid substances had more complex shapes. Yet the
subjects differentiated the two kinds of stimuli similarly in both
experiments.
The next part of the constraint is that children think that when a
word is used to refer to an object, it has as a meaning the kind of
object. The data from the first three experiments were also consistent
with this part of the constraint. In the object trials the children did
choose another object of the original object kind. However, as was
discussed in Experiment 1, these data are equally consistent with a
different interpretation. The subjects may have thought that the meaning
of the word was the referent's shape, but only in the case of words that
referred to objects.
Although the data from Experiments 1 - 3 do not support one
interpretation over the other, the data from Experiments 5 and 6 do. If
the subjects thought that the meaning of an object word was the shape of
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a referent, then they should have done equally well in the naming task of
Experiment 5, all three conditions of Experiment 6, and the object trials
of Experiments 1 - 3. After all, the shape of the named object was
identical to the shape of the correct choice in every case. But the
subjects did not do equally well. In Experiment 5 and in the double
object condition of Experiment 6 they were better than chance, but they
were not near ceiling. In the other conditions of Experiment 6 and in
the first three experiments, they were practically at ceiling. Given the
"shape" interpretation, this difference in the results is unexplained.
However, if the subjects thought that the meaning of an object word was
the object kind of a referent, then their performance could have varied
depending on the condition. Object kind is not necessarily defined by
one property. If shape and other properties define object kind, then
their performance could have varied depending on the properties of the
test choices in the naming tasks. That is, given the "object kind"
interpretation, the difference in performance is explainable. It could
be that the subjects knew in each condition that the meaning of the word
was object kind But were not always able to determine which two objects
were the same kind. That is, it could be that their definition of object
kind was not always sufficient for categorization. Therefore, the
results of Experiments 1 - 3, 5, and 6, together, support the claim that
children infer that object words mean kind of object.13
13. This argument assumes that the subjects found the test choices
equally discriminable across the conditions. If the similarity of the
shapes of the test choices varied such that the two objects of a pair in
the harder conditions were more similar than the two objects of a pair in
the easier conditions, then the results of Experiments 5 and 6 would also
not differentiate the two interpretations. An experiment I suggest later
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The final piece of the constraint is that children think that when a
word is used to refer to a non-solid substance, it has as a meaning the
kind of substance. The data from Experiments 1 - 3 support this part of
the constraint. In the substance trials the subjects chose the substance
of the original substance kind.
However, the 2-year-olds were not as good at determining the meaning
of non-solid substance words as they were at determining the meaning of
object words. And in the first session of the second experiment the
uncharacteristically complex shapes of the substances further confused
the subjects --even though they could manipulate the substances. The
trials in which the substances were in a single complex pile and looked
most like an object were especially difficult. On the other hand, there
is evidence that the subjects knew non-solid substance words. They were
80% - 83% correct in the familiar trials, and most of their mass nouns
were non-solid substance words. There is also evidence that other
2-year-olds know some non-solid substance words. Adam, Sarah, and Eve
used many of them at the beginning of their recordings which was at 2;3
for Adam and Sarah and 1;6 for Eve. Allison used them sparingly at 1;6,
but more often by 2;2.
A possible explanation for the subjects' relative difficulty with
non-solid substance words in the naming task is that they used the
proposed constraint but were also affected by a response bias. The
subjects demonstrated, in the control condition, that they preferred
in the discussion could provide more evidence.
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reaching for single things over multiple things. This bias would have a
detrimental effect on the substance trials relative to the objects trials
because it leads to the correct answer in the object trials, but not
always in the substance trials. However, it does not explain the
subjects' extra difficulty in the first session of the second
experiment.
A possible explanation of that additional confusion is that the
subjects knew that the meaning of the word was the kind of substance but
had not completely determined the defining properties of non-solid
substance kind.14 Non-solid substances have various properties. For
example, they are coalescent, they do not have characteristic shapes,
they often have smells, certain non-solid substances are sticky or wet,
etc. The subjects may have had a definition of non-solid substance kind
that was sufficient for the acquisition of some non-solid substance
words. However, it may also have been partially incomplete with the
effect that when the subjects saw a salient uncharacteristic property on
a non-solid substance, they would have been temporarily confused. This
explanation can account for the subjects' diminished performance in the
first session and their return to normal by the second session.
One way to test this explanation would be to do an experiment using
naming tasks, like the ones of Experiment 6. Various properties of
non-solid substances could be manipulated to determine which properties
14. This explanation is analogous to the explanation of the subjects'
difficulty in inferring the meaning of object words under certain
conditions.
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the subjects considered relevant to non-solid substance kind.
2-year-olds could be compared to 2 1/2-year-olds. The 2 1/2-year-olds in
Experiment 3 were as good on the substance trials as on the object
trials. Data demonstrating that the younger subjects responded,
generally, like the older subjects but were more swayed by inappropriate
factors would support the proposed explanation of the subjects'
difficulty in Experiment 2.
The constraint also has implications for the acquisition of solid
substance words (e.g., "wood" and "metal"). It specifies that a word
said of a solid object has the object kind as a meaning. Since solid
substances are in the form of solid objects, the object part of the
constraint inhibits the mapping of words with solid substance kind. The
analyses of the spontaneous speech of Adam, Sarah, Eve, and Allison
demonstrated that young children do use few solid substance words.
However, before this result can be taken as support for the constraint,
it has to be shown that this is not due to another factor. It was
demonstrated that the frequency of solid substance words in the adult
lexicon is not responsible. And it was argued that the frequency of the
words used by the mothers to their children, although highly correlated
with the children's usage, is also not the reason. However, a critical
experiment has not been done. Subjects need to be taught the solid
substance words in a situation in which the kind of substance of an
object is relevant to the child's interaction with the object. Also, the
words need to be given as modifiers, not nouns. If the children do learn
solid substance words in that kind of experiment, then their difficulty
in their natural environment must be due to a lack of exposure to the
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appropriate conditions for acquisition. On the other hand, if the
subjects still fail to learn the words, then the argument that children
cannot learn solid substance words is quite strong. In that case their
difficulty would provide even more support for the proposed constraint.
If children do have difficulty learning solid substance words,
another question is: do they have a conceptual problem or a linguistic
problem? That is, can they make any inferences over solid substances?
The results of the weight task demonstrate that young children can make
projections over solid substances when asked to make predictions about
weight. Therefore, they can represent the concept "metal" or "metal
object", for example. Their trouble is in mapping the concept with the
word. The constraint supports the mapping of words with kinds of objects
and words with kinds of non-solid substances. But, conditional on the
results of the experiment suggested above, it inhibits the mapping of
words with kinds of solid substances.
Given that children do use the proposed constraint as part of their
solution to the mapping problem, we can ask about the relationship
between the constraint and count/mass syntax. It could be, as Quine
argued, that children are not able to make the ontological distinction
until they are making the syntactic distinction. If so, then children's
use of the constraint would hinge on their knowledge of count/mass
syntax. Once acquired, the syntactic distinction would no longer bear on
the constraint. The data from the 2-year-olds in the first two
experiments demonstrate that count/mass syntax does not have this role.
Subjects who did not yet have the syntactic distinction used the
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constraint effectively and as well as subjects who did have the
distinction. In contrast, the 2 1/2-year-olds in the third experiment
did show a correlation between their use of count/mass syntax and their
use of the constraint. But, the interpretation of that result is
unclear. It does not undermine the fact that 2-year-olds who did not
have the syntactic distinction were not prevented from using the
constraint.
Another role for count/mass syntax is as an additional constraint on
inferences of word meaning. However, the data argue against this role
for count/mass syntax as well. Subjects in Experiments 1 - 3 who were
given count/mass syntax did no better than subjects who were given
nonselective syntax. Gordon (1985) has compared the roles of the two
distinctions in order to examine inferences about the syntactic
properties of a new word. He also demonstrated the independence of
syntax and semantics. Subjects used syntactic properties as the primary
source of information for inferences about other syntactic properties.
However, he found that semantic information could support syntactic
inferences. That conclusion resulted from conditions in which either
there were only semantic cues or the semantic cues and the syntactic cues
were in conflict. The parallel conditions were not done in these
experiments. It is possible that such conditions would demonstrate that
syntactic information can support inferences about semantics, as well as
the reverse.
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Question 2: Is the proposed constraint a constraint on
word meanings or a cognitive constraint used in all inferences
over physical entities?
Experiment 5 addressed this question. The subjects based inferences
about weight on solid substance kind, not object kind. However, the
incorrect answer was a single object. It could be that children can only
base similarity on material kind when material kind is considered as a
property of objects. Or it could be that children can only base
inferences on object kind, but sometimes they define object kind by the
material of the object. In either case, young children would always
think that two single objects were more alike than one of the objects and
a collection of pieces of the material of that object, regardless of the
kind of inference. If so, then the proposed constraint is a general
cognitive constraint.
In order to demonstrate that children can base inferences on material
kind and not object kind, it needs to be shown that under some set of
circumstances children find pieces of an object and the object as more
similar than two objects of the same kind, but different materials.
Hilary Schmidt (1987) has this sort of evidence. Subjects were presented
with trials similar to the object trials of Experiments 1 - 3. However,
the stimuli had smells that corresponded to the materials. The subjects
smelled the first object and were asked to predict which of the
alternatives would have the same smell. In some trials both alternatives
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were single objects. In the other trials the same-material alternative
was in pieces. The subjects chose the same-material alternative in both
cases. In other words, they grouped an object of a certain material with
pieces of that material rather than another object of the same kind.
The weight results and Schmidt's results demonstrate that young
children can make nonlinguistic inferences based on solid substance
kind. However, they do not imply that the proposed constraint is purely
linguistic. There could be other nonlinguistic inferences that also
depend on this constraint. What is clear is that children have at least
two different similarity spaces for objects. Their reason for using the
proposed constraint when making inferences about word meaning is not
because they only have one way of representing and comparing objects.
Rather, it is because the representation of objects used by the proposed
constraint is the most appropriate for mapping with words.
Question 3: How is "kind of object" defined for children?
Experiments 1 - 3 and 6, as well as addressing the mapping problem,
also address a preceding stage in the process of determining word
meanings. When children hear a new word used to refer to an object,
before they face the mapping problem, they need to determine the kind of
the object. The results of the first three experiments demonstrate that
2-year-olds know that an object and pieces of an object are not the same
kind of object, even if they are the same material and the same color.
In other words, they know that for something to be a certain kind of
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object, it must be an object.
The data from Experiment 6 further specify which properties children
use to define object kind. When children need to sort objects by kind
and the only properties available as the basis of their sorting are shape
and material, they can use shape as the defining feature. However, the
subjects were not as consistent with their classifications as when there
were other distinguishing properties. Another factor that the subjects
considered relevant was the regularity of the shapes of the objects.
Objects with regular shapes tend to be artifacts that are built with a
purpose. Objects with irregular shapes tend to be chunks of material
that are a result of accidents or by-products of the building of an
artifact. The subjects knew that an artifact and a chunk were not the
same kind of an object. On the other hand, the subjects did not think
that any property that differentiated the objects was a defining
feature. They were aware that size did not affect object kind. In sum,
the subjects had a concept of object which considered shape and
artifact-ness as relevant to the definition of object kind.
It would be useful to have more experimental conditions in which the
role of size and artifactness are evaluated. Other properties that may
be relevant to object kind could be tested as well, such as the function
of objects. Also it is important to have some conditions in which the
two objects of the same kind do not have the same shape. If 2-year-olds
give the two objects the same name, then that would be the clearest
evidence that they do not think that the meaning of a word used to refer
to an object is the object's shape.
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The acquisition of the mapping between words and meanings would be an
impossible task for even a single word without constraints contributed by
the learner. Yet, 2-year-olds are experts at learning words. They must
have considerable knowledge of language, the world, and their
relationship in the form of constraints. In this work I have proposed
one constraint and have presented evidence from empirical work and
spontaneous speech that supports it. I have also begun to address two
related questions. First, how does the constraint fit into the rest of
the cognitive system? And second, how do children represent an important
prerequisite concept?
By talking with young children, we know that they solve the mapping
problem, somehow. In fact, they succeed so easily, it is often difficult
to recognize that there is a problem. By doing this sort of
investigation, we begin to understand the nature of their very elegant
solution.
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Appendix 1
The question of the independence between the trials of the first and
second session was only asked for the substance trials. Performance was
so good on the object trials that the question is moot.
For each subject a 2 X 2 matrix was set up comparing the response to
each trial, X, in the first session with each trial, Y, in the second
session.
second session
(trial Y)
I/ X
first v| a b
session
(trial X) X c d
There were 16 matrices in all. X = Y in four of them and X =/= Y in the
remaining 12. Two summary matrices were made. The four 2 X 2's in which X
= Y were collapsed to make one and the other 12 were combined to make the
other. The former demonstrates the relationship between the response to
trial X in the first session and the response to trial Y in the second
session when X = Y. The latter shows the same relationship when X =/= Y.
a/(a + b) is the probability that given trial X is right in the first
session, trial Y will be right in the second session. b/(a + b) is the
probability that given trial X is right in the first session, trial Y will
be wrong in the second session. c/(c + d) is the probability that given
trial X is wrong in the first session, trial Y will be right in the second
session. d/(c + d) is the probability that given trial X is wrong in the
first session, trial Y will be wrong in the second session. These
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probabilities can be compared for the two 2 X 2's. The can not be
statistically compared, however, because the same information went into
each matrix and, therefore, they are not independent. For each
probability the difference is .13 or .05 between the two matrices.
probability that given trial
X is right in the first
session trial Y will be
right in the second session
probability that given trial
X is right in the first
session, trial Y will be
wrong in the second session
probability that given trial
X is wrong in the first
session, trial Y will be
right in the second session
probability that given trial
X is wrong in the first
session, trial Y will be
wrong in the second session
a
a+ b
b
a+ b
c
c+ d
d
c+ d
X = Y
.85
.15
.42
.58
x =/= Y
.8
.2
.55
.45
difference
_--.05
.05
-.05
.13
These differences seem sufficiently small enough to consider the
response made to a particular trial in the second session no more
dependent on the response made to the same trial in the first session than
to the response made to any other trial in the first session. In other
words there is no reason to think that the results would be different if
new stimuli had been used in the second session.
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Shapes of non-solid substances in Experiment 2
single.
shape 
Play-doh
peanut butter
multiple
shapes
of
Dippity do
Nivea
clay
Crazy foam
zo IlmSi
0 co
0 0 oorzo
coffee
sawdust
leather
(in very small
pieces)
o 0 0o
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Appendix 3
You are going to be looking at pairs of pictures. The picture on the
left is designated as "A". The picture on the right is designated as
"B". Compare the pictures in terms of their complexity. On your answer
sheet put a plus "+" in the box that corresponds to the picture that you
feel is more complex. Put a minus "-" in the box that corresponds to the
picture that you feel is less complex.
For example, you could see this:
.A -
If you consider "A" to be more complicated than "B", then you should
mark your answer sheet like this:
, _, _,4
IO
.ags,
,( (
II
- a- -, _
$a a a
St
It I
!i !a4 , 
- a a- a
- a - .
If ou av an qston, .s .e beoeyucniu.Ohrietr
- s- -5 _
separate nswer she t. Feel free to take as much time asyou.need* . a (
_, _, 
_,
It, I t
_, _, _,
9 .. 5 a
_, _ _-
_r, _, _,a a s a
_, a _ -
if you have any question- a-.- ae -eor ao otne Ohrie
separate answer sheet. Feel~~~s are o a mc i a o e
.. .- 
_ , a , a ,
.. a-a--
a ,  
- a-a-s
_, _, _,
-- a . a.
_ , _ , a _ ,
- ,- - 5
_9 _, _,
- ,-.-s
_ , a , a ,
-, s-s-
If you have any questions,~~~~~~a as aebfr o otnu.Ohrietr
separate answ r sheet. Feel~~~~~~~~~a fre to takasmctiesyoned
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'Stimuli in Experiment 5
Quadruplet#
#1
Objects
v; CO
W i@~~1
#2
#3
#4
#5
Materials
rough styrofoam (white)
smooth styrofoam (white)
wood
papier mache (grey)
clay
green odeling material
wax (brown)
sponge (yellow)
sandpaper (black)
felt (white)
#6
#7
PIc z
#8
iron
plastic (white)
charcoal
plastic (clear)
sculpting material
plaster (white)
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Appendix 5
Stimuli in Experiment 6
Objects
piece condition
"C" shaped
cootie catcher
whipped wax
cardboard
foil paper
cellophane
vegitable peeler 
pie slicer with ball
at handle
sawdust2
paper mache1
big piece condition
A (L circle-triangle erasoraluminum foil
odd donut
plumbing "T"
honey dipper clear plastic
wood
object condition
&D OD- three spheres
solid hat
stick
dome
coil
plate with rudder
odd saddle
joined pyramids
styrofoam
sand
papermache1
brittle plastic
modelling grass2
clay
2
couscous
dryer lint2
1. The paper mache in the little piece condition was made with strips
of paper bags. The paper mache in the double object condition was
made with bought shredded material.
2. These materials were glued to or stuck on hardened clay.
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Item
little
A
B
Materials
plastic
metal
B
C
D
wax
plaster
copper
plastic
double
A
B
C 1 Q;
D 0 <
